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1. Introduction
1.1. Study Scope and Organization
Sustainable access to adequate water ranks among the most serious chal-
lenges facing the world in the 21st century. Finding solutions requires coor-
dinated efforts by natural and social scientists, engineers, water managers,
policy-makers, and stakeholders from the broader community. These groups
have diverse interests, values, histories, and disciplinary perspectives. Chang-
ing climate, demographics, and economic demands add to the challenge by
presenting a moving target. Complicating matters further are the complex
and seemingly contradictory messages the public receives about expected
changes, especially concerning climate (Barsugli et al., 2013; Hewitson et al,
2014). This poor communication allows parties to focus on messages that
align best with their views, ignoring other viewpoints (Sarewitz, 2004).
Cohesive planning for sustained water resources with community sup-
port will thus require continual co-development of knowledge and problem
solutions (Rosenzweig et al., 2014). Software frameworks permitting wa-
ter sustainability issues to be studied from multiple viewpoints by means
of systematic computational experimentation can potentially enhance this
co-development.
This paper describes the development of the Water and Climate Change
Watershed (WACCShed) Platform, an agent-based software framework for
the modeling of watersheds as dynamic coupled natural and human systems
(Liu et al., 2007). As depicted in Fig. 1, the platform facilitates the study of
hydrology, climate, and human decision-making processes in a watershed over
time. It permits the modeling of the physical and institutional environment
that shapes and channels the actions of human watershed participants. In
turn, as advocated by An (2012), it permits a watershed environment to be
affected by the actions and interactions of its human participants.
To illustrate the capabilities of the WACCShed Platform, findings are re-
ported for a base-case application that captures, in highly simplified form, the
structural attributes of the Squaw Creek watershed in central Iowa (Wendt,
2007). The base case omits institutional arrangements and policies, such
as credit systems and crop insurance programs, in order to highlight more
clearly the types of risks faced by human watershed participants arising from
uncertain physical and economic conditions. The base case also restricts at-
tention to a small number of decision-makers in order to identify with care
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Figure 1: WACCShed: An agent-based software framework for the study of watersheds
the manner in which their risk-management practices result in an intrinsic
dynamic coupling of natural and human systems.
The base-case watershed consists of a farmer who owns and manages
upstream farmland and a city manager who oversees a downstream city sus-
ceptible to flooding. The principal focus of attention is the dynamic interplay
among strategic goal-directed human decision-making, crop production, and
hydrological processes. In pursuit of consumption and savings objectives, the
farmer annually divides her farmland into three portions: cropland; land left
fallow; and retention land, i.e., land for which management practices result
in higher water retention (lower water runoff) than cropland and fallow land.
The city manager annually allocates the city budget among city social ser-
vices, retention-land subsidy payments, and levee investments in pursuit of
city social welfare objectives.
The land and budget allocation decisions of the farmer and city manager
are complicated by environmental uncertainty regarding precipitation pat-
terns, input costs, and crop prices, and by behavioral uncertainty regarding
the future decisions of the other agent. Strategic interaction arises because
the farmer’s land allocations depend on the subsidy rates for retention land
set by the city manager, and the city manager considers this dependence
when determining these subsidy rates.
Alignment of welfare outcomes is a critical prerequisite for the effective
governance of watershed systems since it permits stakeholders to agree on co-
ordinated actions for their common betterment (Ostrom, 1990). This study
reports welfare alignment findings for the base-case watershed under system-
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atically varied settings for four treatment factors. The first factor is the
specification of farmer and city manager decision modes, either OFF or ON.
Under the OFF mode, the decision maker determines annual land or budget
allocations by means of a simple myopic decision rule. Under the ON mode,
the decision maker determines annual land or budget allocations by solving
an expected welfare maximization problem. The second factor is the farmer’s
risk tolerance. The third factor is the farmer’s targeted savings level for the
end of her planning period. The fourth factor is the effectiveness of levee
quality in preventing city flood damage.
A key finding is that welfare misalignment is a common occurrence across
a broad range of tested treatments; that is, farmer welfare and city social
welfare tend to be negatively correlated. For example, all else equal, the
welfare of the farmer tends to be highest when the farmer’s targeted sav-
ings level is moderate; but city social welfare tends to be highest when the
farmer’s targeted savings level is low, forcing her to rely on water-retention
land subsidy payments for the purchase of inputs for crop production.
Section 1.2 clarifies the relationship of this study to the existing litera-
ture. Section 2 outlines key aspects of WACCShed’s software architecture.
The base-case application of the WACCShed Platform is presented in sum-
mary form in Section 3 and in more detailed form in Section 4. Section 5
presents a sensitivity design for base-case computational experiments, with
a focus on welfare comparisons. Dynamic feedback loops affecting welfare
comparisons under this sensitivity design are discussed and illustrated in
Section 6, and detailed welfare outcomes under this sensitivity design are
reported in Section 7. Concluding remarks are given in Section 8. Technical
details are provided in appendices, along with a nomenclature table listing
definitions for key base-case variables and functional forms.
1.2. Relationship to Existing Literature
Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is well suited for the study of dynamic
coupled natural and human (CNH) systems (An, 2012; Heckbert et al, 2010;
Muller et al., 2014; Tesfatsion, 2015). ABM permits researchers to tailor
models to real-world systems rather than forcing researchers to simplify sys-
tem representations purely for analytical tractability. It enables researchers
to develop empirically-based frameworks that capture the salient physical,
biological, and institutional aspects of a real-world system and then pose the
following types of questions: Given these environmental characteristics, what
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do the human participants do? What could they do? What should they do,
given their various purposes?
As detailed in (Axelrod and Tesfatsion, 2006; Borrill and Tesfatsion, 2011;
Chen, 2016), an ABM study of a dynamic system begins with assumptions
about the agents (persistent entities) constituting the system and their po-
tential interactions, and then uses computer simulations to generate histories
that reveal the dynamic consequences of these assumptions. The agents can
range from physical and biological entities with no cognitive function, such as
rivers and crops, to individual and group decision-makers with sophisticated
learning and communication capabilities.
ABM researchers use computer experiments to investigate how large-scale
effects arise from the micro-level interactions of agents, starting from initial
conditions, much as a biologist might study the dynamic properties of a cul-
ture in a petri dish. The first step is to construct a computational world suit-
able for the purpose at hand. The world should incorporate relevant physical
conditions and institutional arrangements, and it should be populated with
decision-making agents endowed with realistic behavioral dispositions and
learning capabilities who interact subject to these conditions and arrange-
ments. The second step is to specify initial conditions for the computational
world. The final step is to permit the computational world to evolve over
time driven solely by agent interactions, with no further intervention from
the modeler.
ABM researchers taking a normative approach to the study of institu-
tional arrangements are interested in two basic types of questions. First, do
current or proposed arrangements promote efficient, fair, and orderly social
outcomes over time, despite possible attempts by system participants to game
these arrangements for their own advantage? Second, under what conditions
might these arrangements give rise to adverse unintended consequences? See
Tesfatsion (2011) for a detailed discussion of this type of study.
Researchers are increasingly using ABM to study how human decisions
influence hydrological processes. Examples include ABM studies of water-
sheds (Valkering et al., 2005; Ng et al., 2011; Nikolic et al., 2013), large river
basins (Barthel et al., 2005; Nickel et al., 2005), and urban area water in-
frastructure (Giacomoni et al., 2013; Kanta and Zechman, 2014; Smith et
al., 2015). Several ABM researchers have used CNH models to study the
interaction of farmers with water resources. Topics have included: the crop-
yield effects of coordination among farmer associations (Lansing and Kremer,
1993); the connection between upstream water management and the viability
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of downstream farming (Becu et al., 2003); the effects of subsistence farming
on deforestation (Bithell and Brasington, 2009); and the impacts of farming
input costs, crop prices, carbon allowances, and biofuel adoption on farmer
behavior and stream nitrate loads (Ng et al., 2011).
These studies demonstrate the power of coupling ABM with models of
hydrology, but they also illustrate some of the challenges. A key challenge is
the trade-off between realism and depth of understanding. As models become
more realistic with regard to their modeling of structure, institutions, and
human behavior, the resulting complexity of the models can limit the ability
to understand the potential effects of changes in these factors (Bithell and
Brasington, 2009; Filatova et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2015).
As will be clarified in subsequent sections, the WACCShed Platform facil-
itates the balancing of realism and understanding. The platform can be used
to develop and study a spectrum of watershed models ranging from relatively
simple conceptual thought-experiments to detailed empirically-grounded rep-
resentations. The flexible modular architecture of the platform eases the
transition from one form of modeling to the next.
2. WACCShed Software Architecture
WACCShed is a software platform developed entirely in Java. It is ex-
pressly designed to support the systematic study of coupled interactions
among hydrological, climate, and human decision-making processes over time.
WACCShed is a modified version of GLOWA-Danubia (Barthel et al,
2008; GLOWA-Danubia Project, 2014). The latter platform is a complex
software framework consisting of over 30 Java packages developed specifically
for the study of the Danube River watershed. To obtain the WACCShed Plat-
form, the packages comprising GLOWA-Danubia were substantially reduced
in number and simplified in form.
As depicted in Fig. 2, WACCShed consists of five principal types of soft-
ware components:
 Configuration: This component reads configuration files into the sys-
tem and sets up three configuration classes (SimulationConfiguration,
AreaMetaData, and ComponentMetaData).
 Modules: Each module is run iteratively by invoking the following four
methods: ProvideData(), StoreData(), GetData(), and Compute().
Each module has: (i) a table of module-specific watershed area units;
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Figure 2: The WACCShed Platform (V1.0) – Principal Software Components
(ii) a set of DataTables (to store run-time module parameter values);
and (iii) a set of interfaces for communication among different modules.
 LocalLinkAdmin: This component functions as a database for register-
ing and retrieving the interfaces of all of the modules.
 TimeController: This component coordinates communication among
different modules, and ensures that data exchanges among different
modules are consistent.
 Simulation: This component is the Main class for instantiating each of
the other four components. It also coordinates the interactions among
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the four other components, and it makes sure the simulation is fault
safe; that is, it will abort the simulation if any simulation failure occurs.
Key capabilities of the WACCShed Platform (V1.0) are as follows:
 The platform can be easily modified and extended in accordance with
user requirements.
 The platform has a simple well-designed TimeController to handle time
coordination among different modules.
 The platform permits the modules to be flexibly implemented.
 The platform can be run on a cluster of computers, given appropriate
extensions of a small number of Java classes.
3. WACCShed Base-Case Application: Overview
3.1. Base-Case Human Decision-Making and Watershed Environment
As depicted in Fig. 3, the base-case application represents an agricultural
watershed that consists of upstream farmland suitable for growing corn and
a downstream city. The upstream farmland is owned by a Farmer seeking
to survive and prosper over time through appropriate annual allocations of
her land among alternative uses. The city is overseen by a City Manager
tasked with maintaining city social services and mitigating city flood damage
through appropriate annual allocations of the city budget.
The decision-making of the Farmer and City Manager are complicated by
three sources of uncertainty. First, both face behavioral uncertainty regard-
ing the decisions to be selected by the other agent, and also by themselves
when faced with equally preferred options (resolved by random “coin flips”).
Second, both face weather uncertainty in the form of stochastic annual pre-
cipitation patterns. Third, the Farmer faces economic uncertainty in the
form of stochastic annual planting costs and corn-market prices.
An additional complicating factor is that the financial and physical en-
vironments vary over time. As will be clarified in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the
Farmer’s money holdings at the start of the initial year are set exogenously.
However, the Farmer’s money holdings at the start of each subsequent year
are then determined endogenously by her interim receipts and expenditures.
Also, levee quality at the start of the initial year is set exogenously. How-
ever, levee quality at the start of each subsequent year is then determined
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Figure 3: Base-case application of the WACCShed Platform
endogenously as a function of the City Manager’s annual levee investment
expenditures and a levee depreciation rate.
3.2. Base-Case Hydrology Module
The hydrology module for the WACCShed base-case application is a
simplified implementation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic
Modeling System (HEC-HMS). HEC-HMS is well tested and widely applied
within the hydrology and engineering communities (Feldman, 2000; Scharf-
fenberg, 2013). For example, it is used by the City of Ames, Iowa, to support
flood prediction and response (Schmieg et al., 2011).
The WACCShed hydrology module permits simulation of single or multi-
ple watershed sub-basins. For the base-case application, the module includes
the entire Squaw Creek watershed (17 sub-basins) in accordance with the con-
figuration and parameterization of the Ames model (Schmieg et al., 2011).
The module includes functions to compute runoff from sub-basin areas, con-
vert the runoff to sub-basin outflow, and route the sub-basin outflow to the
watershed outlet. However, since it is primarily designed for the simulation
of peak flow rates, a constant baseflow is assumed for simplicity. Runoff and
river routing processes, as well as discharge output, are computed on a time-
step identical to the time-step used for rainfall input data. Currently the
module is capable of simulating either on a 30-minute or a 1-hour time-step.
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The required input for the hydrology module is precipitation, and the out-
put is discharge at the watershed outlet. The module is currently designed
to use point-scale rainfall data (e.g., rain gauge data). The point-scale values
are processed using the Thiessen Polygon gauge weighting technique to com-
pute an average precipitation for each sub-basin. The Thiessen weights must
be computed outside the module and specified prior to running the module.
Runoff for each sub-basin is computed using the sub-basin average pre-
cipitation and the curve number method. The curve number is an empirical
value that describes the water runoff potential of a specified land area based
on attributes such as vegetation cover and soil type.
4. Timeline of Activities for the Base-Case Application
4.1. Timeline of Activities: Overview
Activities in the base-case watershed are divided into periods (“years”)
during which a particular succession of events and decisions takes place. This
section provides the timeline for these activities, first in summary verbal form,
and then in more detailed analytic form.
A nomenclature table listing symbols and definitions for key base-case
variables is provided in Appendix A. Technical details regarding the forms
of the harvest productivity function and the city flood-damage function are
relegated to Appendix B and Appendix C. Since the decision modes used by
the Farmer and City Manager to make their land and budget allocation de-
cisions are behavioral treatment factors, a detailed discussion of these modes
is postponed until Section 5.4.
4.2. General Timeline of Annual Events and Decisions
In February the City Manager allocates the annual city budget among
three portions to enhance city social welfare subject to feasibility constraints.
City social welfare is expressed as a weighted combination of city social ser-
vices and the mitigation of city flood damage. The first budget portion is
for city social-service expenditures. The second budget portion is for subsidy
support for retention land as a city flood-damage mitigation measure. The
third budget portion is for investment in levee maintenance and improve-
ments, another city flood-damage mitigation measure. The City Manager
then sets the subsidy rate for retention land for the current year. In making
these decisions, the City Manager takes into account their likely effect on the
Farmer’s subsequent land-allocation decisions.
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In March, given the retention-land subsidy rate and a realization for input
planting costs, the Farmer allocates her farmland among cropland, retention
land, and fallow land in pursuit of consumption and savings goals subject to
feasibility constraints. The Farmer immediately receives a subsidy payment
from the City Manager for her retention-land portion. The Farmer then
uses her resulting money holdings to purchase the inputs needed to plant her
cropland with corn.
In October the City Manager observes the flood damage that has occurred
in the city. This damage depends on the peak rate of water discharged
into the city as well as on the city’s levee quality. The peak discharge rate
depends on the Farmer’s land use and on the precipitation pattern realized
during January through September. The city’s levee quality depends on the
levee investment undertaken by the City Manager in February for repairs
and improvements, the quality of the levee at the start of the year, and the
levee depreciation rate.
During October through December the Farmer harvests her corn crop,
sells corn at the currently realized market price, and retains (and/or buys)
corn for her own consumption. The size of the Farmer’s corn crop depends on
the amount of her cropland and on the precipitation pattern realized during
January through September.
At the end of December the Farmer and City Manager take stock of all
that has happened during the past year. In particular, they consider the
realizations for stochastic events (input costs, precipitation pattern, corn
price), as well as the land and budget allocation decisions they each have
taken. The Farmer considers how these events and decisions have affected the
net benefits she has obtained from corn consumption as well as the amount
of savings she has been able to put aside for future use. The City Manager
considers how these events and decisions have affected city social welfare.
Both the Farmer and the City Manager then use these considerations to
inform their decision processes for the following year.
4.3. Detailed Timeline of Annual Events and Decisions
The analysis of the base-case watershed takes place over successive sim-
ulated years t = 1, 2, . . . . As depicted in Table 1, each year t is divided into
seasonal subperiods t1, . . . , t7 during which various events and decisions are
realized. Subperiod tk denotes the time interval [t:k, t:(k + 1)), with t:1 = t
and t:8 = t+ 1. Thus, year t covers the time interval [t:1, t:8) = [t, t+ 1).
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Table 1: Base-Case Timeline for Year-t Events and Decisions
Jan Feb March April-Sept Oct Nov Dec
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7
For simplicity, it is assumed for the base case that the Farmer and City
Manager are able to observe each event and decision as it occurs. The spe-
cific events and decisions occurring during each successive subperiod tk for a
general year t will now be more carefully explained.
January (subperiod t1): An input cost per acre is realized.
At the beginning of subperiod t1 = [t:1,t:2) the Farmer and City Manager
are in information states IFt:1 and I
CM
t:1 . These information states incorporate
all currently observable aspects of their decision environments, including all
maintained structural aspects, all event realizations observed prior to time
t:1, and all decisions taken prior to time t:1. In particular, IFt:1 includes the
Farmer’s time-t:1 money holdings Mt:1, I
CM
t:1 includes the year-t city budget
Bt:1, and both information sets include a planting density (seeds/acre) for
cropland.1 An input cost per acre is then realized, as follows:
InputCostt:1 = Input cost ($/acre)
= Per-acre cost of seed and chemicals
needed to plant cropland (1)
February (subperiod t2): City Manager allocates city budget.
At the beginning of subperiod t2 = [t:2,t:3) the City Manager allocates the
city budget Bt:1 into a city social service expenditure portion, a subsidy
portion, and a levee investment portion. This budget allocation is determined
1In the current study, the planting density is assumed to be constant over time. The de-
cisions of the Farmer and City Manager during year t depend on their time-t:1 information
states, but this dependence is suppressed below for ease of notation.
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by the values set for two percentages, st:2 and `t:2, as follows:
RetSubposs(st:2) = st:2 ·Bt:1
= Dollars set aside for retention-land subsidy spending (2)
τt:2 = τ(st:2) = [RetSub
poss(st:2)]/[r
maxAF ]
= Retention-land subsidy rate ($/acre) set for year t (3)
LevInv(`t:2) = `t:2 ·Bt:1
= Dollars set aside for levee repair and improvement (4)
SocServposs(st:2, `t:2) = Bt:1 − RetSubposs(st:2)− LevInv(`t:2)
= Dollars set aside for city social service spending (5)
In (3), AF denotes the total amount of farmland in the watershed, and rmax
is a watershed policy parameter that determines the maximum portion of AF
that the Farmer is allowed to allocate as retention land.
The City Manager’s budget allocation in turn determines levee quality
for year t, as follows:
LQt:2 = LQ(`t:2) = [1− δ]LQ(t−1):2 + gLevInv(`t:2)
= Levee quality for year t (6)
In (6), g (ft/$) maps dollars of levee investment into levee quality (height),
δ is a depreciation rate, and the levee quality LQ(t−1):2 determined at time
(t − 1):2 for year t − 1 is known to the City Manager from inclusion in his
information set ICMt:1 .
March (subperiod t3): The Farmer allocates her farmland.
At the beginning of subperiod t3 = [t:3,t:4) the Farmer allocates her farm-
land AF among cropland, retention land, and fallow land. This allocation is
determined by the values set for two percentages, ct:3 and rt:3, as follows:
Acrop(ct:3) = ct:3A
F = Farmer’s cropland for year t (7)
Aret(rt:3) = rt:3A
F = Farmer’s retention land for year t (8)
Afal(ct:3, rt:3) = A
F − Acrop(ct:3)− Aret(rt:3)
= Farmer’s fallow land for year t (9)
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This land allocation determines additional outcomes at time t:3, as follows:
RetSubact(τt:2rt:3) = τt:2rt:3A
F
= F’s actual retention-land subsidy receipts ($) for year t (10)
SocServact(τt:2rt:3, `t:2) = Bt:1 − RetSubact(τt:2rt:3)− LevInv(`t:2)
= CM’s actual city social service spending ($) for year t (11)
The Farmer’s money holdings at time t:3 are thus given by
Mt:3(τt:2rt:3) = Mt:1 + RetSub
act(τt:2rt:3) ≥ 0 (12)
The Farmer does not want to waste resources by designating more farm-
land as cropland than she can afford to plant. Since the planting density
(seeds/acre) is a known constant over time, and a realization InputCostt:1
($/acre) for year-t input costs has already been observed at time t:1, the
Farmer can ensure non-wastage of cropland by imposing the following addi-
tional constraint on her choice of the percentages (ct:3, rt:3) at time t:3:
InputCostt:1 · ct:3AF = InputCostt:1 · Acrop(ct:3)
≤ Mt:3(τt:2rt:3) (13)
For later purposes, note that condition (13) together with the requirement
ct:3 ≤ 1 impose the following upper bound on ct:3:
ct:3 ≤ cmax(τt:2rt:3) ≡ min{1, Mt:3(τt:2rt:3)
InputCostt:1 · AF
} (14)
April-September (subperiod t4): The Farmer buys inputs, plants
her corn crop, and tends her cropland.
At the beginning of subperiod t4 = [t:4,t:5) the Farmer uses her money hold-
ings Mt:3(τt:2rt:3) to purchase all inputs needed to plant A
crop(ct:3). The
Farmer’s money holdings at time t:4, after all input purchases have been
made, are given by
Mt:4(ct:3, τt:2rt:3) = Mt:3(τt:2rt:3)− InputCostt:1Acrop(ct:3) ≥ 0 (15)
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October (subperiod t5): A precipitation pattern is realized, which
determines city social welfare and the Farmer’s corn crop.
At the beginning of subperiod t5 = [t:5,t:6) a precipitation pattern Precipt:5
is realized based on rainfall occurring during subperiods t1 through t4. This
precipitation pattern determines the following outcomes:
Ht:5 = H(Precipt:5) = Harvest productivity (bushels/acre) for year t (16)
CCropt:5(ct:3) = Ht:5 · Acrop(ct:3) = Corn crop (bushels) for year t (17)
Qp,t:5(ct:3, rt:3) = Qp
(
Precipt:5, A
crop(ct:3), A
ret(rt:3), A
fal(ct:3, rt:3)
)
= Peak water discharge rate into the city during t1-t4 (18)
FDt:5(`t:2, ct:3, rt:3) = FD
(
LQ(`t:2), Qp,t:5(ct:3, rt:3),
)
= City flood damage ($) during year t (19)
CSWt:5(τt:2, `t:2, ct:3, rt:3)
= CSW
(
SocServact(τt:2rt:3, `t:2), FDt:5(`t:2, ct:3, rt:3)
)
= City social welfare ($) for year t (20)
Detailed specifications for the harvest productivity function (16) and the
flood-damage function (19) are provided in Appendix B and Appendix C.
The precise form of the city social welfare function (20) is given below in
Section 5.4; see (31).
November (subperiod t6): A corn price is realized.
At the beginning of subperiod t6 = [t:6,t:7) a corn price, CPricet:6 ($/bushel),
is realized in the corn market. This corn price in turn determines
Valuecropt:6 (ct:3) = CPricet:6CCropt:5(ct:3)
= Market value ($) of the Farmer’s corn crop (21)
December (subperiod t7): Farmer welfare is determined, and the
Farmer and City Manager update their information states.
At the beginning of subperiod t7 = [t:7,t:8), the Farmer’s possible money
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holdings if she sells all of her crop are given by
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) = Mt:4(ct:3, τt:2rt:3) + Value
crop
t:6 (ct:3) (22)
The Farmer sells corn in the corn market at price CPricet:6 and retains
(and/or buys) corn in amount ConsFt:7 to consume for herself. This deter-
mines her year-t welfare, measured by the utility (benefit) she obtains from
the consumption of ConsFt:7. This consumption is determined as follows:
 If the Farmer is unable to attain at least her subsistence consumption
level C¯F (i.e., if Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) < CPricet:6 · C¯F ), then she consumes
ConsFt:7 =
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)
CPricet:6
< C¯F (23)
and dies at the end of subperiod t7.
 If Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) ≥ CPricet:6 · C¯F , then the Farmer selects a con-
sumption level ConsFt:7 and a savings level S
F
t:7 subject to the following
budget, survival, and nonnegativity constraints:
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) = S
F
t:7 + CPricet:6 · ConsFt:7 (24)
ConsFt:7 ≥ C¯F (25)
SFt:7 ≥ 0 (26)
Thus, the Farmer’s money holdings for the start of year t+ 1 are
M(t+1):1 = S
F
t:7 (27)
At the end of subperiod t7, the Farmer (if alive) forms her updated infor-
mation state IF(t+1):1. This updated information state consists of her previous
information state IFt:1, a record of the events and decisions she observed during
year t, and her money holdings (27) for the start of year t+ 1.
At the end of subperiod t7 the City Manager forms his updated informa-
tion state ICM(t+1):1. This updated information state consists of his previous
information state ICMt:1 , a record of the events and decisions he observed dur-
ing year t, plus the city budget B(t+1):1 for year t+ 1.
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5. Sensitivity Design for the Base-Case Application
5.1. Sensitivity Design Overview
The sensitivity design for the base-case application focuses on welfare
alignment. Sensitivity studies are conducted to determine how Farmer and
City Manager welfare outcomes change in response to systematic variations
in four treatment factors.
The first treatment factor, called the Behavioral Treatment, determines
the decision modes used by the Farmer and the City Manager to determine
their annual land and budget allocations. The second treatment factor, called
the Farmer’s risk tolerance, is a parameter D appearing in the function used
to determine the Farmer’s utility (benefit) from consumption. As clarified
below, the setting for D affects the Farmer’s tolerance for consuming at her
subsistence level C¯F , where any unexpected downward fluctuation in con-
sumption would be disastrous for her survival. The third treatment factor is
a scaling parameter θ0 that determines the initial magnitude of the Farmer’s
savings target (money holdings) at the end of her planning period. The
fourth treatment factor, called Levee Quality Effectiveness (LQE), measures
the extent to which the City Manager’s levee investments are effective in
mitigating city flood damage.
Apart from these four treatment factors, all parameters and structural
aspects of the base-case watershed are maintained at fixed settings for all of
the sensitivity findings reported in this study.
5.2. Base-Case Settings for Maintained Parameter Values
The base-case settings for the maintained parameter values characterizing
the harvest productivity function H(Precip) and the flood damage function
FD(LQ,Qp) are given in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. The
base-case settings for other maintained parameter values are given in Table 2.
5.3. Base-Case Settings for Environmental Scenarios
The annual weather (precipitation pattern) and economic conditions (costs
and prices) are key environmental events driving the dynamics of the base-
case watershed. For simplicity, these annual events are assumed to be gov-
erned by independent stationary probability distributions known to the Farmer
and the City Manager.
The independent stationary probability distributions for the annual corn-
production input cost, precipitation pattern, and corn price for the base-case
application are specified below.
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Table 2: Base-Case Settings for Other Maintained Parameter Values
Symbol Base-Case Setting Description
LRun 20 years Length of each simulation run
NScenarios 31 Number of scenarios tested for each treatment
AF 4,000 acres Farmland owned and managed by F
AW 444 acres City land area managed by CM
Bt:1 $1,000,000 City budget at time t:1 for each year t
C¯F 125 bushels F’s subsistence corn-consumption for each year t
CNcrop 78 Curve number for cropland with mature crop
CNfal 70 Curve number for fallow land
CNret 10 Curve number for retention land
δ 0.02 Levee quality depreciation rate for each year t
g 10−5 ft/$ Parameter in levee quality update function
LQ0:2 3 ft Initial levee quality (height)
M1:1 $4,000,000 F’s initial money holdings
ψ 1.0 City social welfare function parameter
rmax 0.25 F’s max permitted retention land %, a policy variable
1. Three possible realizations for annual corn-production input costs es-
timated for 1997-2013 based on 2005-2013 data for seed and chemical
costs, assuming corn-following-corn (ISU, 2015a):
Low Input Cost: $604.20/acre (25% probability)
Moderate Input Cost: $698.00/acre (50% probability)
High Input Cost: $815.50/acre (25% probability)
2. Three possible realizations for annual precipitation (rainfall depth in
inches), based on 1997-2013 data for Ames, Iowa (IEM, 2015):
Low Precipitation (1999 data) (25% probability)
Moderate Precipitation (2007 data) (50% probability)
High Precipitation (2005 data) (25% probability)
3. Three possible realizations for the annual corn price, based on 1997-
2013 data (ISU, 2015b):
Low Corn Price: $3.66/bushel (25% probability)
Moderate Corn Price: $4.40/bushel (50% probability)
High Corn Price: $5.68/bushel (25% probability)
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Making use of these independent stationary probability distributions for
annual events, an ensemble S consisting of 31 potential environmental sce-
narios s, each covering 20 simulated years, was constructed for use in all
reported computational experiments. Each scenario s takes the form
scenario s =
(
(xs1, y
s
1, z
s
1), (x
s
2, y
s
2, z
s
2), . . . , (x
s
20, y
s
20, z
s
20)
)
(28)
where
xsj = input cost (low, mod, or high) in year j under scenario s
ysj = precipitation (low, mod, or high) in year j under scenario s
zsj = corn price (low, mod, or high) in year j under scenario s
Figure 4: Probability distribution for the base-case environmental scenarios
As detailed in Appendix D, the 31 scenarios in the ensemble S have
unique scenario numbers ranging from -15 to +15, assigned in accordance
with their Hamming-measure distance from a normal scenario 0. The normal
scenario 0 is characterized by moderate input costs, moderate precipitation,
and moderate corn prices in each of the 20 simulated years. Scenarios with
negative scenario numbers tend to deviate from scenario 0 on the low side,
and scenarios with positive scenario numbers tend to deviate from scenario 0
on the high side. The bell-shaped probability distribution function calculated
for these 31 scenarios is depicted in Fig. 4.
5.4. Behavioral Treatments
As detailed in Section 4.3, at time t:3 during each year t the Farmer
allocates her farmland among cropland, retention land, and fallow land. This
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land allocation is determined by the values set for the cropland and retention-
land percentages (ct:3, rt:3), which must lie in the following decision domain:
DDF (rmax) = {(c, r) | 0 ≤ c, 0 ≤ r ≤ rmax, c+ r ≤ 1} (29)
In (29), rmax in [0, 1] denotes the maximum percentage of farmland that the
Farmer is permitted to set aside as retention land, interpreted as a watershed
policy parameter.
Also, at time t:2 during each year t the City Manager allocates his city
budget among city social-service expenditures, subsidy payments to retention
land, and levee investment, taking into account the potential effects of the
subsidy rate on subsequent Farmer decisions. This budget allocation is de-
termined by the values set for the subsidy and levee investment percentages
(st:2, `t:2), which must lie in the following decision domain:
DDCM = {(s, `) | 0 ≤ s, 0 ≤ `, s+ ` ≤ 1} (30)
Two decision modes are considered for the Farmer: F-OFF (myopic
decision-maker) and F-ON (welfare optimizer). Also, two decision modes
are considered for the City Manager: CM-OFF (myopic decision-maker) and
CM-ON (welfare optimizer). For each decision mode, random “coin flips”
are used to resolve indifference among available decision options.
More precisely, as detailed in Appendix E and Appendix F, the following
four behavioral treatments are tested:
Behavioral Treatment 1: (F-OFF, CM-ON)
 The Farmer at time t:3 during each year t selects a land allocation
from DDF (rmax) that maximizes her expected money holdings at the
start of time t:7, taking as given the year-t retention-land subsidy rate
determined by the City Manager at time t:2. The Farmer at time t:7
then consumes as much as possible, subject to feasibility constraints
and a year-t savings-target constraint.
 The City Manager at time t:2 during each year t selects a budget allo-
cation from DDCM that maximizes expected city social welfare (CSW)
for year t subject to feasibility constraints, taking into account how the
resulting year-t retention-land subsidy rate will affect the Farmer’s land
allocation at time t:3. Actual CSW for year t, determined at time t:5,
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is a weighted average of city social services ($) and city flood-damage
mitigation ($) given by
CSWt:5 = SocServ
act
t:3 + ψ ·
[
FDmax − FDt:5
]
(31)
In (31), ψ is a trade-off parameter, FDmax denotes maximum avoid-
able city flood damage,2 FDt:5 denotes actual city flood damage, and
[FDmax − FDt:5] measures avoided city flood damage.
Behavioral Treatment 2: (F-ON, CM-ON)
 The Farmer at time t:3 during each year t determines an information-
contingent plan for her year-t land allocation and consumption deci-
sions by maximizing her year-t expected utility-of-consumption (UOC)
subject to feasibility constraints, a savings-target constraint, and the
retention-land subsidy rate determined by the City Manager at time
t:2. Letting ConsFt:7 denote the Farmer’s corn consumption at time t:7,
the UOC she attains from this corn consumption is measured by
UOCt:7 = u(Cons
F
t:7) = ln(Cons
F
t:7 − C¯F +D) , (32)
where the parameter D satisfies D > C¯F .3
 The City Manager behaves the same as in Behavioral Treatment 1.
Behavioral Treatment 3: (F-OFF, CM-OFF)
 The Farmer behaves the same as in Behavioral Treatment 1.
 The City Manager at time t:2 during each year t selects budget-allocation
percentages equal to their time-t:2 expected values under Behavioral
Treatment 1.
Behavioral Treatment 4: (F-ON, CM-OFF)
 The Farmer behaves the same as in Behavioral Treatment 2.
 The City Manager at time t:2 during each year t selects budget-allocation
percentages equal to their time-t:2 expected values under Behavioral
Treatment 2.
2As seen in Appendix C, FDmax is a parameter in the city flood damage function.
3This restriction on D ensures (32) is well-defined even when ConsFt:7 = 0.
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5.5. Farmer Risk Tolerance Treatments
As seen in Section 5.4, the UOC attained by the Farmer from consumption
of a corn amount ConsFt:7 in any year t is given by (32). The parameter D
appearing in (32), in bushel units, is required to be greater than the Farmer’s
subsistence consumption level C¯F=125.
By straightforward differentiation operations, it can be shown that
1
D
=
−u′′(C¯F )
u′(C¯F )
(33)
Under F-ON treatments, the ratio 1/D in (33) measures the Farmer’s risk
aversion4 at her subsistence consumption level C¯F , which implies that D
measures the Farmer’s risk tolerance at C¯F . Subsistence consumption is
risky because any small downward fluctuation results in disaster (death) for
the Farmer, hence zero consumption.
For the base-case application, the risk-tolerance parameter D is systemat-
ically varied as a treatment factor across computational experiments. Results
for two different D settings are reported in this study, as follows:
Low Risk Tolerance: D = 125.0001 bushels
High Risk Tolerance: D = 126 bushels
Note that D determines the UOC value that the Farmer assigns to zero
consumption (death). Specifically, given C¯F=125 bushels, it follows that
u(0) = ln(−125 +D) ≈
{ −9 if D = 125.0001 bushels
0 if D = 126 bushels
(34)
Under F-OFF treatments, the Farmer is only concerned with maximizing her
yearly expected consumption; she does not consider the dispersion (variance)
4For the purposes of this study, risk is defined to be possibility that adverse outcomes
occur that differ from expected outcomes. The ratio −u′′(C)/u′(C), referred to as the
Arrow-Pratt Measure of Risk Aversion (APMRA) (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964), is a stan-
dard metric used by economists to measure the risk aversion of a consumer with a UOC
function u(C). The APMRA provides a normalized measure of the curvature of u relative
to the case of a linear UOC function whose curvature is zero. Given a consumer who
maximizes expected UOC, the higher this consumer’s APMRA, the more this consumer
will be concerned about the possibility of adverse consumption outcomes that deviate from
expected consumption outcomes.
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of her possible UOC outcomes. Under F-ON treatments, however, the Farmer
maximizes her yearly expected UOC; hence, the greater the curvature of her
UOC function (i.e., the smaller the setting for D), the more the Farmer will
take this dispersion into account.
5.6. Farmer Savings-Target Treatments
As noted in Section 5.4, under each behavioral treatment the Farmer at
time t:3 during each year t determines her land allocation and consumption
decisions subject to a savings target for her end-of-year money holdings. This
savings target takes the form
SF (θ0) = θ0 · E[CPrice] · C¯F (35)
In (35), θ0 is a unit-free non-negative scalar that affects the magnitude of
the Farmer’s savings target, E[CPrice] is the stationary expectation for the
annual corn price, and C¯F is the Farmer’s annual subsistence need for corn.
For the base-case application, the savings-target parameter θ0 is systemat-
ically varied as a treatment factor across computational experiments. Results
for three different θ0 settings are reported in this study, as follows:
Low Savings Target: θ0 = 100
Moderate Savings Target: θ0 = 5,000
High Savings Target: θ0 = 20,000
As detailed in Appendix E, these are initial settings in the following sense:
If a θ0 setting results in a savings target (35) that would prevent the Farmer
from consuming at least her subsistence consumption C¯F , the Farmer incre-
mentally decreases this setting until either she can attain C¯F or θ0=0.
5.7. Levee Quality Effectiveness Treatments
As detailed in Appendix C, the flood damage function FD(LQ,Qp) de-
termines city flood damage as a function of city levee quality LQ and the
peak water discharge rate Qp into the city. Among the parameters charac-
tering this function are a1 and a99, which determine the effectiveness of the
levee quality LQ in mitigating city flood damage.
For the base-case application, a common value – referred to as Levee
Quality Effectiveness (LQE) – is set for these two parameters; i.e., LQE =
a1 = a99. This LQE value is then systematically varied as a treatment factor
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across computational experiments. Results for two different LQE settings
are reported in this study, as follows:
Low Levee Quality Effectiveness: LQE = 51.5 cfs/ft
High Levee Quality Effectiveness: LQE = 98.2 cfs/ft
6. Dynamic Feedback Effects in the Base-Case Application
As a prelude to the detailed presentation of welfare sensitivity results in
Section 7, this section provides a more careful discussion of the dynamic cou-
pled feedback effects underlying these welfare results. These feedback effects
arise from strategic decision-making taking place within physical production
and hydrological processes.
As detailed in Section 4.3, city social welfare (CSW) in each year t is a
function (31) of city social services and city flood-damage mitigation in year t.
City social welfare fluctuates from one year to the next in response to changes
in factors affecting either welfare component. These factors include farmland
allocation, budget allocation, precipitation, and levee quality depreciation.
Farmland allocation affects potential city flood damage, since different types
of land cover affect precipitation runoff. The budget allocation trades off city
social services against increased city flood protection. Finally, precipitation
and levee quality depreciation affect the potential for city flood damage.
Also, the welfare obtained by the Farmer in each year t is determined
by the utility-of-consumption (UOC) she gains from corn consumption in
year t, as measured by (32). The Farmer’s UOC fluctuates from one year to
the next in response to changes in factors affecting consumption possibilities.
These factors include farmland allocation, retention-land subsidy rates, input
costs, precipitation, and corn prices. Farmland allocation affects the Farmer’s
potential sources of income (crop sales versus subsidy payments). Subsidy
rates determine income per acre of retention land. Input costs, precipitation,
and corn prices affect potential net earnings from crop sales.
Environmental uncertainty is another factor that complicates the under-
lying dynamics. As detailed in Section 5.3, input costs, precipitation, and
corn prices are modeled as stochastic processes. Possible realizations for
these stochastic processes are modeled as an ensemble of 31 possible scenar-
ios with associated probabilities. As seen in Fig. 4, this distribution reaches
its peak at scenario 0, referred to as the normal scenario, which is charac-
terized by moderate input costs, moderate precipitation, and moderate corn
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prices. However, as indicated in Table 3, the Farmer and City Manager do
not necessarily achieve higher welfare outcomes under the normal scenario.
Table 3: Ceteris Paribus Effects of Random Events on the Farmer and City Manager
Parameter Low High Rationale
Input Costs + for F − for F Low input costs encourage more
− for CM + for CM cropland and less retention land
Precipitation − for F − for F Dry/wet land is bad for crops
+ for CM − for CM but dry lessens city flood risk
Corn Price ? for F ? for F F gains/loses from low corn
? for CM ? for CM price if F is a corn buyer/seller
In particular, low input costs and moderate precipitation are favorable
for the Farmer’s corn harvest, and hence for Farmer welfare. However, the
extent to which either low or high corn prices are favorable for Farmer welfare
depends on the extent to which the Farmer ends up buying or selling corn in
the corn market to secure her desired consumption and savings levels.
On the other hand, low input costs tend to be unfavorable for city social
welfare because they encourage the Farmer to allocate more of her land to
cropland and less to retention land. Low precipitation tends to be favorable
for city social welfare since it reduces the threat of city flooding. However,
high input costs and/or low corn prices can also be favorable for city social
welfare if the Farmer reacts by allocating more of her land to retention land
rather than cropland, since retention land lessens the threat of city flooding.
An example will now be given to illustrate the complicated interplay of
these effects over 20 simulated years. Simulated time series outcomes will
be compared when the Farmer’s decision mode is changed from F-OFF to
F-ON, given a fixed decision mode CM-ON for the City Manager and fixed
values (High, Mod, Low) for the remaining treatment factors (D, θ0, LQE).
The environmental scenario selected for this illustration is s = −1 in
Fig. 4. The component values for this scenario are plotted in Fig. 5. In
earlier years, input costs vary between low and moderate, precipitation varies
between low and moderate, and corn prices generally vary between moderate
and high; these years are relatively favorable for farming. In later years, input
costs vary between moderate and high, precipitation tends to vary between
moderate and high, and corn prices tend to vary between moderate and low;
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Figure 5: Illustrative environmental scenario s = −1 for input costs, precipitation, and
corn prices over 20 simulated years
Figure 6: Illustrative time-series outcomes for the Farmer and City Manager over 20
simulated years, given scenario s = −1, (D, θ0, LQE) = (High, Mod, Low), and F-OFF
these years are less favorable for farming.
Given these settings, Fig. 6 plots outcomes for the Farmer and City Man-
ager when the Farmer uses the F-OFF decision mode. Throughout all 20
years, the F-OFF Farmer persistently allocates 1000 of her 4000 acres of
farmland to retention land, the maximum allowable portion (rmax=0.25).
During the first thirteen years, the F-OFF Farmer devotes her remaining
3000 acres to cropland. During the final seven years, however, the F-OFF
Farmer alternates the allocation of these 3000 acres between cropland and
fallow land. What explains these land allocation decisions?
As detailed in Appendix E.2, at time t:3 during each year t the F-OFF
Farmer determines the allocation of her farmland among cropland, retention-
land, and fallow land by comparing the per-acre expected net earnings from
each option. The F-OFF Farmer calculates these expected net earnings tak-
ing as given the input cost realized at time t:1 and the retention-land subsidy
rate set by the City Manager at time t:2. From Figs. Fig. 5 and 6, it is seen
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that the F-OFF Farmer’s land allocation decisions are driven by these two
conditioning factors.
Specifically, given LQE=Low, levee investment is not an effective use of
city budget monies for city flood-damage mitigation. Consequently, the City
Manager sets levee investment to zero each year, and he sets the subsidy
rate for retention land at the lowest possible level that ensures the F-OFF
Farmer allocates the maximum allowed portion of her land (1000 acres) to
retention land. In the early years favorable to farming, the subsidy rate has
to be raised in years 2, 5, and 8 to counter low input cost realizations that
increase the relative profitability of cropland. In other years, however, a
lower subsidy rate suffices to ensure that the F-OFF Farmer allocates 1000
acres to retention land.
The F-OFF Farmer’s remaining allocation decision is between cropland
and fallow land. The F-OFF Farmer’s cropland allocation at time t:3 during
each year t exhibits a strong negative correlation with the input cost realized
at time t:1. In years 13, 15, and 17 the high input costs induce the F-OFF
Farmer to devote her remaining 3000 acres to fallow land; in all other years
the low to moderate input costs induce the F-OFF Farmer to devote her
remaining 3000 acres to cropland.
The precipitation pattern and corn price realized at times t:5 and t:6
during each year t do not affect the F-OFF Farmer’s land allocation decision
at time t:3. However, the precipitation pattern affects the F-OFF Farmer’s
harvest productivity (bushels/acre) determined at time t:5 and the corn price
affects the F-OFF Farmer’s net earnings per acre of cropland, determined at
time t:7, as well as her ability to buy corn (if necessary) to ensure subsistence
consumption at time t:7. Consequently, fluctuations in precipitation and corn
prices from one year to the next tend to cause fluctuations in the F-OFF
Farmer’s welfare from one year to the next.
The City Manager’s subsidy-rate increases in years 2, 5, and 8 result in
drops in city social welfare, since less budget monies are available for city
social services. Additional drops in city social welfare occur in years 14 and
19 due to a combination of factors leading to higher city flood damage in
these years: namely, high precipitation, and large cropland allocations (3000
acres) with corresponding increases in runoff risk. Since levee investment is
zero during these years, the ongoing depreciation in levee quality results in
a larger drop in city social welfare in year 19 than in year 14.
Consider, instead, the Farmer and City Manager outcomes plotted in
Figure 7 for the case in which the Farmer uses the F-ON decision mode.
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A budget allocation of 10% for subsidy payments, resulting in a $100/acre
subsidy rate, is sufficient to ensure the F-ON Farmer persistently allocates
1000 of her 4000 acres of farmland to retention land, the maximum allowed
portion. In years 2, 5, and 8 the low input costs induce the F-ON Farmer to
allocate her remaining 3000 acres to cropland. In all other years the F-ON
Farmer leaves these 3000 acres fallow because she perceives crop planting
to be too risky. Despite having no income from crop sales, she is able to
sustain her corn consumption above subsistence by using her steady stream
of subsidy payments to purchase corn in the corn market.
Figure 7: Illustrative time-series outcomes for the Farmer and City Manager over 20
simulated years, given scenario s = −1, (D, θ0, LQE) = (High, Mod, Low), and F-ON
Comparing Fig. 6 for F-OFF with Fig. 7 for F-ON, it is seen that the
more cautious behavior of the F-ON Farmer in the face of environmental risk
results in higher and more stable Farmer welfare outcomes over time. The
F-OFF and F-ON Farmers both allocate 1000 acres to retention land in each
of the 20 years, thus benefiting from a steady stream of subsidy payments.
However, based on expected net earnings assessments, the F-OFF Farmer
allocates her remaining 3000 acres to cropland rather than fallow land in
all but four of the 20 years, ignoring the risk of negative net earnings from
cropland. In contrast, the risk-averse F-ON Farmer largely avoids this risk
by choosing to leave her remaining 3000 acres fallow in all but three years.
Although the F-ON and F-OFF Farmers make different decisions regard-
ing the allocation of their remaining 3000 acres between cropland and fal-
lowland, this has essentially no affect on potential city flood damage because
the cropland curve number (78) and the fallow land curve number (70) are
similar. However, for the F-ON case, the City Manager does not need to
raise the subsidy rate in years 2, 5, and 8 to ensure the Farmer maintains
1000 acres as retention land. This results in more stable city social welfare
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outcomes over time for the F-ON case relative to the F-OFF case.
7. Welfare Sensitivity Results for the Base-Case Application
7.1. Welfare Results: Introduction
This section reports welfare findings for our base-case sensitivity studies.
As detailed in Section 5, four treatment factors are highlighted. The decision
modes specified for the Farmer and City Manager, OFF or ON, determine
how they select their yearly land and budget allocations. The Farmer’s risk
tolerance and savings-target scaling parameters D and θ0 determine the de-
gree of caution the Farmer displays as she attempts to both survive and
prosper in her uncertain world. Finally, levee quality effectiveness (LQE)
determines the extent to which the City Manager’s levee investments are
effective in mitigating city flood damage.
7.2. Welfare Results: Summary Report
Figures 8 and 9 report normalized welfare outcomes under a range of
treatments, conditional on CM-ON and CM-OFF respectively. Each figure
displays four result matrices, where each result matrix reports six normalized
welfare outcomes for the Farmer and City Manager for six tested combina-
tions of θ0 and LQE, conditional on a particular setting D for the Farmer’s
risk tolerance and a particular setting F-OFF (two-stage decision mode) or
F-ON (max yearly expected UOC) for the Farmer’s decision mode.
In each of the eight result matrices displayed in Figs. 8 and 9, Farmer
welfare is measured as normalized farmer welfare (NFW), defined as follows:
NFW ≡ FW − FW
min
FWmax − FWmin (36)
In (36), FW denotes the Farmer’s expected total UOC calculated across the
31 possible environmental scenarios for 20 simulated years, and FWmin and
FWmax denote the minimum and maximum values attained by FW across
all 48 tested combinations of θ0 and LQE in the eight result matrices.
Similarly, in each of the eight result matrices displayed in Figs. 8 and 9,
the welfare of the city is measured as normalized city welfare (NCW), defined
as follows:
NCW ≡ CW − CW
min
CWmax − CWmin (37)
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Figure 8: Normalized Farmer welfare (NFW) and normalized city welfare (NCW) for
farmer decision modes F-OFF and F-ON under various (D, θ0, LQE) settings, conditional
on CM-ON
In (37), CW denotes expected total CSW calculated across the 31 possible
environmental scenarios for 20 simulated years, and CWmin and CWmax
denote the minimum and maximum values attained by CW across all 48
tested combinations of θ0 and LQE in the eight result matrices.
The results reported in Fig. 8 for CM-ON show that, all else equal, NCW
increases and NFW stays the same or decreases as LQE is increased from low
to high. This occurs because the increase in LQE implies that a higher CSW
outcome can be obtained for the same overall budget spending level, either
by maintaining current spending portions, or by shifting monies away from
levee investment and towards city social services and/or subsidy payments.
This same LQE sensitivity pattern is also observed in Fig. 9 for CM-OFF,
with four exceptions. Given F-OFF, θ0 either Mod or High, and D either
Low or High, it is seen that NCW in fact declines from 68.38 to 0 as LQE is
increased from Low to High.
These four exceptional cases occur because, given CM-OFF, the City
Manager sets his subsidy and levee investment portions in each year t at
their expected year-t values (across scenarios) for the corresponding CM-ON
case. In some scenarios for some years, these portions are far lower than the
portions set by the CM-ON City Manager based on input cost observations
and calculated F-OFF Farmer responses to alternative subsidy rate settings.
Faced with a low subsidy rate, the F-OFF Farmer with a moderate or high
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Figure 9: Normalized Farmer welfare (NFW) and normalized city welfare (NCW) for
farmer decision modes F-OFF and F-ON under various (D, θ0, LQE) settings, conditional
on CM-OFF
savings target will tend to put all of her land into cropland because she has
enough accumulated money holdings to afford the input costs. The combined
effect of a large amount of cropland with low levee investment then results
in relatively large city flood damage. This in turn results in a low NCW
outcome relative to the corresponding CM-ON case. Indeed, NCW equals
zero for these four exceptional cases, the lowest NCW value attained across
all 48 tested treatments reported in Figs. 8 and 9.
The results reported in Figs. 8 and 9 show that Farmer and city welfare
outcomes are not well aligned with regard to Farmer savings behavior. All
else equal, NFW is at or very near its highest level when the Farmer’s targeted
savings level is set at a moderate level (θ0=Mod). On the other hand, NCW
tends to be highest when the Farmer saves too little (θ0=Low); in this case
the Farmer allocates at least some of her land to retention land in order to
secure income for the purchase of inputs for crop production.
The only exceptions to the pattern of highest NCW occurring at θ0=Low
are for the treatments with LQE=Low and F-ON. In the latter treatments,
regardless of the settings for other treatment factors, NCW is highest when
θ0=High.
The reason for this is as follows. Given LQE=Low (in contrast to High),
retention land increases its effectiveness as a city flood-damage mitigation
measure in comparison with levee investment. Given θ0=High (in contrast
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to Low or Mod) the F-ON Farmer foresees that she will have to consume at
her subsistence level C¯F , regardless of her land allocation. Consequently, she
randomly allocates her farmland among cropland, retention land, and fallow
land, regardless of the subsidy rate, which results on average in a relatively
high portion of retention land. Moreover, perceiving the F-ON Farmer’s
lack of responsiveness to the subsidy rate, the CM-ON City Manager sets
the subsidy rate to zero and devotes the entire city budget to other welfare-
enhancing expenditures. The CM-OFF City Manager likewise sets a zero
subsidy rate, which is the expected subsidy rate for the CM-ON case.
On the other hand, conditional on θ0=Mod, Farmer and city welfare
outcomes are well aligned with regard to the Farmer’s decision mode. All
else equal, both NFW and NCW increase if the Farmer’s decision mode is
changed from F-OFF to F-ON.
An interesting aspect of Fig. 8 for CM-ON and Fig. 9 for CM-OFF is that
NFW and NCW display a high degree of insensitivity to the City Manager’s
decision mode. The only exceptions are the treatments, noted above, with
F-OFF, θ0 either Mod or High, LQE=High, and D either Low or High. For
reasons noted above, in these treatments the CM-ON City Manager achieves
much higher NCW than the CM-OFF City Manager.
A surprising aspect of Figs. 8 and 9 is that NFW and NCW are highly
insensitive to the setting for the Farmer’s risk tolerance D. A priori, we pos-
tulated that the Farmer’s higher tolerance for risk under a higher value of D
would lead to riskier decision-making. However, all else equal, a change from
D=Low to D=High has essentially no effect on Farmer decisions. Rather,
the only effect is a larger dispersion of UOC outcomes for D=Low resulting
from the larger negative UOC value assigned to death for D=Low; see (34).
The explanation for this insensitivity appears to be the relatively low proba-
bility of extreme scenarios in which the Farmer dies, as well as the relatively
high setting (C¯F=125 bushels) for the Farmer’s subsistence consumption.5
Given this insensitivity, we hereafter only report results for D=High.
5The Farmer’s logarithmic UOC function (32) is extremely flat as a function of D in a
neighborhood of C¯F=125. For example, if the Farmer consumes C¯F=125 bushels in each
of the 20 simulated years, her resulting total UOC summed over these 20 simulated years
equals 96.6 for D=Low and 96.7 for D=High.
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7.3. Detailed Welfare Results
7.3.1. Welfare Metrics
In this section the welfare of the Farmer is measured by total UOC at-
tained over 20 simulated years, and the welfare of the city is measured by
total CSW attained over 20 simulated years. Outcomes for total UOC and
total CSW are reported in two forms: (i) in expected form, as a probability-
weighted average across the 31 possible environmental scenarios, together
with dispersion ranges; and (ii) differentiated by environmental scenario.
Regarding form (i), bar charts are used to report expected values and dis-
persion ranges for total UOC and total CSW under various treatments. The
height of a bar indicates expected value, and the vertical line centered at each
bar height depicts the dispersion range for the expected value, determined
as plus or minus one standard deviation around the expected value.
Regarding form (ii), each scenario – identified by its scenario number –
represents low, moderate, or high annual realizations over 20 simulated years
for three environmental factors: namely, input cost, precipitation, and corn
price. The scenarios are dispersed around the normal scenario 0 for which
all factors take on moderate values. As cautioned in Section 7.1, however,
welfare outcomes are not systematically related to scenario numbers; for
example, welfare outcomes do not necessarily peak at the normal scenario
0. Detailed discussions are provided below for the welfare patterns displayed
across scenarios.
Finally, in interpreting the reported results below, which are conditioned
on high Farmer risk tolerance D=126 bushels and a subsistence consumption
level C¯F=125 bushels, it is useful to recall two points derivable from (32) and
(34). First, if the Farmer consumes at her subsistence level C¯F in each of
the 20 simulated years, then the total UOC she attains is 96.7. Second, at
zero consumption (death), the UOC of the Farmer is u(0) = 0.
7.3.2. Detailed Welfare Results: CM-ON
Figures 10 and 11 provide an alternative visualization of the expected
welfare outcomes reported in Fig. 8 for D=High and CM-ON. As previously
noted, all else equal, expected welfare for both the Farmer and the City
Manager tend to be higher for F-ON than for F-OFF.
A new aspect of Figs. 10 and 11 is the reporting of dispersion ranges.
An immediate observation here is that the dispersion of welfare outcomes
tends to be larger (and in some cases substantially larger) for the F-OFF
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Figure 10: Expected total UOC (with dispersion ranges) for farmer decision modes F-OFF
and F-ON under various (θ0, LQE) settings, given D=High and CM-ON.
Figure 11: Expected total CSW (with dispersion ranges) for farmer decision modes F-OFF
and F-ON under various (θ0, LQE) settings, given D=High and CM-ON.
treatments relative to the F-ON treatments. The dispersion ranges reflect
the extent to which welfare outcomes fluctuate across scenarios. To provide
a better understanding of these dispersion ranges, Figures 12 and 13 report
welfare outcomes for the same set of treatments depicted in Figs. 10 and 11,
only now differentiated by environmental scenario.
Two striking aspects of Figs. 12 and 13 are: (i) larger fluctuations across
scenarios for the F-OFF treatments relative to the F-ON treatments; and
(ii) the high degree of welfare misalignment for the F-ON treatments. To
understand these findings, it is essential to examine carefully the underlying
dynamic interactions between the Farmer and the City Manager.
Consider, first, the F-ON treatments with θ0=High, denoted by upward-
pointing triangles. For each treatment, welfare outcomes for both the Farmer
and the City Manager tend to be relatively stable across scenarios; yet total
UOC tends to be relatively low whereas total CSW tends to be relatively
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Figure 12: Total UOC for farmer decision modes F-OFF and F-ON under various (θ0,
LQE) settings, by scenario, conditional on D=High and CM-ON.
high. What explains these findings?
The F-ON Farmer’s high savings target forces her to consume at her
subsistence level each year, hence her total UOC is at the subsistence level
96.7 across scenarios. The F-ON Farmer is able to foresee this result, hence
she understands that her UOC will not be affected by her land allocation.
She therefore chooses her land allocation randomly, resulting in a retention-
land allocation of 500 acres (half the maximum allowed portion) on average.
Perceiving the F-ON Farmer’s lack of responsiveness to the subsidy rate,
the CM-ON City Manager sets the subsidy rate to zero and devotes the
entire city budget to city social services and levee investment. Thus, total
CSW tends to be relatively high and stable across scenarios, with a higher
total CSW resulting for LQE=High (upward-pointing solid triangles) than
for LQE=Low (upward-pointing open triangles).
Next consider the F-ON treatments with (θ0,LQE)=(Low,High), denoted
by downward-pointing solid triangles. Total UOC tends to be relatively low
across scenarios, fluctuating within a small range above subsistence, while
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Figure 13: Total CSW for farmer decision modes F-OFF and F-ON under various (θ0,
LQE) settings, by scenario, conditional on D=High and CM-ON
total CSW tends to be relatively high across scenarios. What explains these
results?
Under these settings the F-ON Farmer has a low savings target and con-
sumes most of her money holdings at time t:7 during each year t, which in
turn results in low savings from one year to the next. The CM-ON City Man-
ager foresees that the F-ON Farmer will have to depend on subsidy payments
if she wants to allocate any sizable portion of her farmland to cropland. In
particular, he foresees that a subsidy rate set very close to zero will suffice
to induce the F-ON Farmer to allocate the maximum allowed portion of her
farmland to retention land. Moreover, since LQE=High, levee investment is
an effective alternative flood-damage mitigation option to subsidy payments,
which provides another incentive to the City Manager to offer a subsidy rate
that is very close to zero. In consequence, subsidy payments are very small,
and the F-ON Farmer typically allocates fewer than 100 of her farmland acres
to cropland due to lack of income for the payment of input costs. Although
her exposure to crop production risks is small, her UOC in good farming
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years is also small. On the other hand, CSW tends to be relatively high.
For the remaining F-ON treatments, denoted by circles and downward-
pointing open triangles, either θ0=Mod or (θ0,LQE) = (Low,Low). The
F-ON Farmer is therefore able to purchase inputs for crop production ei-
ther through her own savings (θ0=Mod) or through subsidy payments for
retention land (LQE=Low). The F-ON Farmer diversifies her land between
cropland and retention land, and this diversification tends to result in high
total UOC outcomes across scenarios. On the other hand, total CSW tends
to be relatively low across scenarios because the City Manager has to devote
more of the city budget to subsidy payments and/or to levee investment to
ensure city flood-damage mitigation.
Now consider, instead, the F-OFF treatments reported in Figs. 12 and 13.
Welfare outcomes for some treatments exhibit relatively large fluctuations
across scenarios, and the degree of welfare alignment is mixed. What explains
these findings?
For the F-OFF treatments with (θ0,LQE)=(Low,High), which are de-
noted by downward-pointing solid triangles, total UOC tends to be relatively
low across scenarios whereas total CSW tends to be relatively high across
scenarios. The explanation for this welfare misalignment is similar to the
explanation for the F-ON case. Given her low savings from one year to the
next, the F-OFF Farmer is forced to augment her savings with income from
subsidy payments if she wishes to purchase the inputs required to plant even
modest amounts of cropland. Also, since LQE=High, levee investment is
an effective flood-mitigation alternative to retention-land subsidy payments.
The City Manager thus foresees each year that he can achieve a relatively
high CSW by setting a relatively low retention-land subsidy rate. As a result,
total UOC fluctuates within a small range above subsistence across scenarios
while total CSW tends to be relatively high across scenarios.
For the F-OFF treatments with either θ0=Mod or (θ0,LQE) = (Low,Low),
denoted by circles and downward-pointing open triangles, total UOC tends
to be relatively high across scenarios whereas total CSW tends to be rela-
tively low across scenarios. The explanation for this welfare misalignment
is again similar to the explanation for the corresponding F-ON treatments.
On the other hand, total UOC and total CSW both exhibit much greater
dispersion across scenarios in these F-OFF treatments than in the corre-
sponding F-ON treatments. As in the corresponding F-ON treatments, the
F-OFF Farmer is able to purchase inputs for crop production either through
her own savings (θ0=Mod) or through subsidy payments for retention land
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(LQE=Low). However, in comparison with the F-ON Farmer, the F-OFF
Farmer on average tends to allocate five times more of her land to cropland
because she ignores the production risks arising from uncertain precipitation
and corn prices. Consequently, although the F-OFF Farmer does better than
the F-ON Farmer in good crop years, she does worse than the F-ON Farmer
in bad crop years and is more likely to die before the end of the 20 years. If
the Farmer dies, all of her land reverts to fallow land with a relatively high
curve number (runoff potential).
Finally, consider the F-OFF treatments with θ0=High, denoted by upward-
pointing triangles. Total UOC and total CSW both tend to be relatively low
across scenarios for these treatments. The essential reason for this welfare
alignment is that the F-OFF Farmer is myopic; she does not foresee that
her high savings target will require her to consume at her subsistence level
regardless of her land allocation, and she does not take into account the risks
associated with crop production. Thus, in comparison with the correspond-
ing F-ON treatments, the F-OFF Farmer tends to allocate more farmland
to cropland and less to retention land, even though the City Manager sets a
higher subsidy rate for retention land. This larger cropland allocation (with
higher runoff potential), together with higher subsidy payments, reduces to-
tal CSW in comparison with the corresponding F-ON treatments.
7.3.3. Detailed Welfare Results: CM-OFF
Figure 14: Expected total UOC (with dispersion ranges) for farmer decision modes F-OFF
and F-ON under various (θ0, LQE) settings, given D=High and CM-OFF.
Figures 14 and 15 provide an alternative visualization of the expected
welfare outcomes reported in Fig. 9 for D=High and CM-OFF. As for the
CM-ON case, all else equal, expected welfare for both the Farmer and the
City Manager tend to be higher for F-ON than for F-OFF; and the dispersion
of welfare outcomes tends to be larger (and in some cases substantially larger)
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Figure 15: Expected total CSW (with dispersion ranges) for farmer decision modes F-
OFF and F-ON under various (θ0, LQE) settings, given D=High and CM-OFF, with
corresponding average City Manager subsidy rates ($/acre) and levee investments ($)
for the F-OFF treatments relative to the F-ON treatments. To provide a
better understanding of these findings, Figures 16 and 17 report welfare
outcomes for the same set of treatments depicted in Figs. 14 and 15, only
now differentiated by environmental scenario.
Comparing the scenario-conditioned results in Figs. 16 and 17 for CM-
OFF with the scenario-conditioned results in Figs. 12 and 13 for CM-ON,
only one significant difference is seen. Given F-OFF, the total CSW that re-
sults under treatments (θ0,LQE) = (Mod,High) and (θ0,LQE) = (High,High)
is far more volatile for CM-OFF than for CM-ON.
What explains this difference? As seen in Section 7.2, the two indicated
treatments are precisely the treatments for which NCW=0, the lowest NCW
level attained across all tested treatments. These NCW=0 outcomes occur
because the CM-OFF City Manager sets his annual budgeted portions for
subsidy payments and levee investment at their expected optimal annual
levels, ignoring actual conditions.
Specifically, these expected optimal annual levels are calculated as the
probability-weighted averages of the scenario-conditioned optimal annual lev-
els determined in the CM-ON case. Consequently, in each year t these ex-
pected optimal levels do not take into account the actual input cost for year
t or the way in which the F-OFF Farmer will respond to this actual input
cost in choosing her year-t land allocation.
For scenario realizations that are close to normal, the resulting differ-
ences in total CSW outcomes for the CM-OFF and CM-ON treatments are
not substantial. However, for more extreme scenario realizations, the city
can sustain a relatively large amount of flood damage in the CM-OFF case
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Figure 16: Total UOC for farmer decision modes F-OFF and F-ON under various
(θ0, LQE) settings, by scenario, given D=High and CM-OFF.
because the CM-OFF City Manager has not taken proper precautions to
protect against flood damage.
This is precisely what happens in treatments (θ0,LQE) = (Mod,High) and
(θ0,LQE) = (High,High). The CM-ON City Manager sets his annual subsidy
and levee investment portions at levels that are substantially higher than the
portions set by the CM-OFF City Manager in these same treatments. This
occurs because the CM-ON City Manager knows that an F-OFF Farmer
does not consider crop production risks. Thus, an F-OFF Farmer with a
moderate or high savings target, hence with plenty of money holdings on
hand for the purchase of inputs for crop planting, will tend to allocate a
large portion of her farmland to cropland (with high runoff potential). To
protect against this, the CM-ON City Manager allocates a relatively large
portion of the annual city budget to retention-land subsidy payments and to
levee investment.
The CM-OFF City Manager does not take these precautions; he allocates
relatively small portions of the annual city budget to subsidy payments and
levee investment in these two treatments. The combined effects of a large
amount of cropland with low levee investment then results in a relatively
large amount of city flood damage in environmental scenarios with moderate
to high precipitation.
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Figure 17: Total CSW for farmer decision modes F-OFF and F-ON under various
(θ0, LQE) settings, by scenario, given D=High and CM-OFF.
8. Conclusion
This study reports on the development the WACCShed Platform, an
agent-based framework that permits watersheds to be studied as open-ended
dynamic CNH systems. A key feature of the platform is its ability to model
strategic decision-making among interacting human participants seeking to
survive and prosper within a watershed environment constrained by institu-
tional arrangements and physical processes. A relatively simple watershed
application is presented to illustrate how the platform can be used to deter-
mine the effects of these human interactions on private and social welfare
outcomes over time.
The flexible modular architecture of the WACCShed Platform makes it
particularly well suited for Iterative Participatory Modeling (IPM). The IPM
approach envisions multidisciplinary researchers and stakeholders engaging
together in the ongoing study of a real-world system of mutual interest for
the purpose of discovering more effective governance tools. This ongoing
study involves a repeated looping through four stages: field study and data
analysis; role-playing games; agent-based model design and implementation;
and intensive computational experiments (Barreteau et al., 2012; Daniell,
2012; Giuliani and Castelletti, 2013). As depicted in Fig. 1, the WACCShed
Platform is currently being used as an initial modeling platform for an IPM
process whose purpose is improved local governance for the Squaw Creek
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Watershed in central Iowa.
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Appendix A. Nomenclature for Base-Case Variables
Table A.4 provides a list of symbols and abbreviated definitions for the
key variables and functional forms appearing in the modeling of the base-
case watershed. A variable is classified as exogenous (Exog) if its value is an
external input to the base-case watershed model and endogenous (Endog) if
its value is determined within the base-case watershed model.
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Table A.4: Nomenclature for Key Base-Case Variables and Functions
Symbol Variable Type Units Description
AF Exog acres Farmland owned and managed by F
Acropt:3 Endog acres Cropland selected by F at t:3
Arett:3 Endog acres Retention land selected by F at t:3
Afalt:3 Endog acres Fallow land selected by F at t:3
AW Exog acres City land area managed by CM
Bt:1 Exog $ City budget at time t:1 for year t
ct:3 Endog % F’s cropland allocation at t:3
C¯F Exog bushels F’s subsistence corn-consumption for each year t
CCropt:5 Endog bushels F’s corn crop realized at t:5
CM Exog dm agent City Manager residing in urban watershed area
ConsFt:7 Endog bushels F’s actual corn consumption at t:7
CPricet:6 Exog $/bushel Corn price realized at t:6
CSWt:5 Endog $ City social welfare for year t, determined at t:5
D Exog bushels Parameter in F’s utility-of-consumption (UOC) function
δ Exog % Levee quality depreciation rate for each year t
F Exog dm agent Farmer residing in rural watershed area
FDmax Exog $ Maximum avoidable flood damage for the city
FDt:5 Endog $ City flood damage realized at t:5
g Exog ft/$ Parameter in levee quality update function
Ht:5 Endog bushels/acre Harvest productivity realized at t:5
ICM1:1 Exog info CM’s initial information state at time 1:1
IF1:1 Exog info F’s initial information state at time 1:1
ICMt:k Endog info CM’s information state at time t:k 6= 1:1
IFt:k Endog info F’s information state at time t:k 6= 1:1
InputCostt:1 Exog $/acre Per-acre corn planting input cost realized at t:1
`t:2 Endog % CM’s budget allocation for levee investment at t:2
LevInvt:2 Endog $ CM’s levee investment at t:2
LQ0:2 Exog height in feet Levee quality for year 0 determined at 0:2
LQt:2 Endog height in feet Levee quality for year t determined at t:2
M1:1 Exog $ F’s initial money holdings at time 1:1
Mt:k Endog $ F’s money holdings at time t:k 6= 1:1
Mposst:7 Endog $ F’s money holdings at t:7 if she sells her total crop
Precipt:5 Exog rainfall Precipitation pattern realized at t:5
ψ Exog unit-free scalar Parameter in city social welfare function
Qp,t:5 Endog cfs Peak water discharge rate into city during t1-t4
rmax Exog % Upper bound on F’s r decisions, a policy variable
rt:3 Endog % F’s retention-land allocation decision at t:3
RetSubposst:2 Endog $ CM’s planned subsidy payment expenditures at t:2
RetSubactt:3 Endog $ CM’s actual subsidy payment expenditures at t:3
s Exog scenario Environmental conditions (weather & market)
st:2 Endog % CM’s budget allocation for subsidy payments at t:2
SFt:3(θ) Endog $ F’s savings target at t:3 (function of θ)
SFt:7 Endog $ F’s actual savings level determined at t:7
SocServposst:2 Endog $ CM’s planned social service expenditures at t:2
SocServeactt:3 Endog $ CM’s actual social service expenditures at t:3
t Exog year identifier t = 1, 2, . . ., with year t ≡ time interval [t, t+ 1)
t:k Exog time point k = 1, . . . 8, with t:1 ≡ t and t:8 ≡ t+ 1
tk Exog subperiod tk ≡ [t:k, t:k + 1), k = 1, . . . , 7
τt:2 Endog $/acre Retention-land subsidy rate set by CM at t:2
θ0 Exog unit-free scalar Initially given value for θ
UOCt:7 Endog utils F’s utility-of-consumption for year t, determined at t:7
Valuecropt:6 Endog $ Market value of F’s corn crop at t:6
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Appendix B. Base-Case Harvest Productivity Function
In the base-case application, the planting density (seeds/acre) is assumed
to be constant over time, and harvest productivity (bushels/acre) at time t:5
during each year t is determined as a function only of precipitation:
Ht:5 = H(Precipt:5) (B.1)
The precise manner in which the harvest productivity function (B.1) is spec-
ified will now be explained. This specification is not an empirically-derived
expression. Rather, it is a general qualitative depiction of key relationships.
Figure B.18: Base-case specification for the harvest productivity function H, conditional
on a constant planting density (seeds/acre)
The precipitation pattern Precipt:5 realized during the year-t growing sea-
son (subperiods t1 through t4) is proxied by rainfall depth Dt, i.e., the total
accumulated rainfall during subperiods t1 through t4, measured in inches. As
depicted in Fig. B.18, harvest productivity attains its maximum value Hmax
for a certain optimal amount of rainfall, Dopt. Below this optimal amount,
harvest productivity is reduced because the crops need more water. Above
this optimal amount, harvest productivity is reduced because the soil is too
wet. For either low rainfall or high rainfall, harvest productivity is a fraction
αH of H
max.
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More precisely, the base-case harvest productivity function (B.1) takes
the following Gaussian form:
Ht:5 = H
max ·
[
αH + (1− αH) exp
(
− (Dt −D
opt)2
σ2D
)]
(B.2)
The parameter σD in (B.2) controls the width of the bell curve. The following
specific parameter values are maintained for (B.2):6
 αH = 0.8
 Dopt = 26.72 inches
 Hmax = 168 bushels/acre
 σD = 5 inches
Appendix C. Base-Case Flood Damage Function
In the base-case application, flood damage FDt:5 to the city at time t:5
during each year t is determined as a function of the city’s levee quality
LQt:2 and the peak water discharge rate Qp,t:5 into the city during the year-t
growing season (subperiods t1 through t4):
FDt:5 = FD(LQt:2, Qp,t:5) (C.1)
The precise manner in which the flood damage function (C.1) is specified will
now be explained. This specification is not an empirically-derived expression.
Rather, it is a general qualitative depiction of key relationships.
As illustrated in Fig. C.19, for any given levee quality, flood damage FD is
assumed to be small until the water discharge rate Q reaches a point where
the water flow begins to overtop the levee. As Q increases further, flood
damage increases sharply. However, for large Q, the entire city is flooded
and flood damage approaches the maximum avoidable flood damage, FDmax.
More precisely, for any given levee quality LQ, the base-case flood damage
function (C.1) is specified as a logistic function:
FD(LQ,Qp,t:5) =
FDmax
1 + exp
(− Qp,t:5−Qh(LQ)
∆Q(LQ)
) (C.2)
6The setting for Hmax is the Northwest Iowa district average corn yield from 2005-2014,
as reported in AGDM (2015, Table 1).
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Figure C.19: Base-case specification for the flood damage function FD, conditional on a
given levee quality
where
Qh(LQ) =
Q1(LQ) +Q99(LQ)
2
(C.3)
and
∆Q(LQ) =
Q99(LQ)−Q1(LQ)
9.2
(C.4)
and Q1 and Q99 are the the discharges at which the flood damage is 1% and
99%, respectively, of the maximum value. The discharge rates Q1(LQ) and
Q99(LQ) are assumed to increase linearly with levee quality:
Q1(LQ) = Q1n + a1LQ (C.5)
Q99(LQ) = Q99n + a99LQ (C.6)
where Q1n and Q99n are the values of Q1 and Q99 for no levee and a1 and a99
are coefficients.
The following specific parameter values are maintained for the base-case
flood damage function (C.2):
 The base-case value for FDmax is a fixed proportion of the City Man-
ager’s base-case annual city budget B = $1M :
FDmax = 100 ·B (C.7)
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 The peak water discharge rates Qp for different types of years:
Low Precipitation year: Qp = 369.8 cfs
Normal Precipitation Year: Qp = 451.8 cfs
High Precipitation year: Qp = 756.7 cfs
 The ordinates in the linear affine relationships (C.5) and (C.6):
Q1n = 369.8 cfs
Q99n = 756.7 cfs
As detailed in Section 5.7, in the base-case application a common “levee
quality effectiveness” (LQE) value is set for the parameters a1 and a99 in
(C.5) and (C.6). This LQE value is then systematically varied as a treatment
factor across computational experiments.
Appendix D. Base-Case Scenario Construction for Random Events
As explained in Section 5.3, in the base-case application the annual input
costs, weather (precipitation pattern), and corn price for the base-case wa-
tershed are assumed to be governed by independent stationary probability
distributions. Based on these distributions for annual environmental condi-
tions, an ensemble S consisting of 31 possible environmental scenarios s was
constructed for the base-case watershed using the following eight steps.
1. Three Java pseudo random number generators initialized with 5000
distinct seeds were used to generate three groups of 5000 sequences
of length 20 for input costs x, precipitation y, and corn price z, re-
spectively, in accordance with the independent stationary probability
distributions specified in Section 5.3.
2. The sequences from these three groups were then matched (in their
order of generation) to form 5000 scenarios sˆ, each 20 simulated years
in length, as illustrated below:
sˆ =
(
(xsˆ1, y
sˆ
1, z
sˆ
1), (x
sˆ
2, y
sˆ
2, z
sˆ
2), . . . , (x
sˆ
20, y
sˆ
20, z
sˆ
20)
)
(D.1)
3. Without loss of generality, the numerical x, y, and z values in each
scenario sˆ were then replaced by indicator values equal to 0 for a low
value, 1 for a moderate value, and 2 for a high value.
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4. The resulting collection Sˆ of 5000 scenarios sˆ was then enlarged to 5003
scenarios by the addition of (i) the extreme-low scenario slow consisting
of all 0 values; (ii) the normal scenario snorm consisting of all 1 values;
and (iii) the extreme-high scenario shigh consisting of all 2 values. Let
this augmented scenario set be denoted by SˆA.
5. The distance d(sˆ, snorm) of each scenario sˆ in SˆA from the normal sce-
nario snorm was then calculated using a Hamming signed-distance mea-
sure that calculates the accumulated differences in successive scenario
values. For example, given a two-year scenario
sˆ = ((0, 1, 1), (2, 1, 0)) and snorm = ((1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)) (D.2)
one has
d(sˆ, snorm) = (0− 1) + (1− 1) + (1− 1) + (2− 1) + (1− 1) + (0− 1)
= −1. (D.3)
6. Each scenario sˆ in SˆA was then assigned to one and only one of the
following 31 scenario clusters Sd in accordance with its signed distance
d = d(sˆ, snorm):
−60, [−59,−15], [−14,−13], − 12, − 11, − 10, .....,−1
0, 1, ....., 10, 11, 12, [13, 14], [15, 59], 60 (D.4)
7. For each scenario cluster Sd, a single representative scenario sd was then
selected from among those scenarios in Sd having the highest assigned
probability. The resulting set S of 31 selected scenarios sd was then
taken to be the scenario ensemble for the base-case application.
8. The original probability assigned to each sd in S was then re-normalized
by setting this probability equal to the number of scenarios in cluster
Sd, divided by 5003, so that the summation of the re-normalized prob-
abilities attached to the 31 scenarios in S exactly equaled 1.0.
9. Each of the 31 scenarios sd in S was then assigned a scenario number
equal to its signed distance from the normal scenario snorm. Note that
the scenario number for snorm is 0.
The resulting probability distribution for the 31 environmental scenarios
in S is depicted in Fig. 4.
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Appendix E. Farmer’s Base-Case Decision Modes
Appendix E.1. The Farmer’s Intertemporal Welfare Maximization Problem
For the base-case application, the ultimate intertemporal objective of the
Farmer at time t:3 is assumed to be the selection of an information-contingent
plan for her land allocation decisions {cy:3, ry:3} and consumption decisions
{ConsFy:7} over all future years y ≥ t to maximize her expected intertemporal
utility-of-consumption (UOC), measured by
E[
∞∑
y=t
βy−tUOCy:7 | IFt:3] (E.1)
In (E.2), β is a positive time-preference discount factor, and UOCy:7 takes
the form
UOCy:7 = u(Cons
F
y:7) = ln(Cons
F
y:7 − C¯F +D) (E.2)
where: ln denotes the natural logarithm function; ConsFy:7 denotes the Farmer’s
corn consumption determined at time y:7 for year y; C¯F denotes the Farmer’s
positive annual corn-consumption subsistence needs; and D is a risk tolerance
parameter whose value is constrained to satisfy D > C¯F .7
The farmer’s land allocation and consumption decisions at time y:3 in
each year y ≥ t must be compatible with the following survival, budget, and
feasibility constraints:
ConsFy:7 ≥ C¯F (E.3)
CPricey:6 · ConsFy:7 ≤ Mpossy:7 (E.4)
0 ≤ cy:3 (E.5)
0 ≤ ry:3 ≤ rmax (E.6)
cy:3 + ry:3 ≤ 1 (E.7)
From the vantage point of time t:3, the Farmer’s possible money holdings
Mpossy:7 at the future time y:7 depend either directly or indirectly on all of the
7The restriction D > C¯F > 0 ensures that (E.2) is well defined even if CFy:7=0 (F dies)
or CFy:7=C¯
F in some year y.
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event and decision realizations occurring between t:3 and y:7. This can be
deduced from the relationships set out in Section 4.3, as follows:
Mpossy:7 = My:4 + Value
crop
y:6
= My:4 + CPricey:6 · CCropy:5
= My:4 + CPricey:6 ·Hy:5 · Acropy:3
= My:4 + CPricey:6 ·Hy:5 · cy:3 · AF (E.8)
Moreover, the Farmer’s money holdings My:4 at time y:4, given by
My:4 = My:3 − InputCosty:1 · Acropy:3
= My:3 − InputCosty:1 · cy:3 · AF
= My:1 + RetSub
act
y:3 − InputCosty:1 · cy:3 · AF
= My:1 + τy:2 · Arety:3 − InputCosty:1 · cy:3 · AF
= My:1 +
sy:2 ·By:1
rmaxAF
· Arety:3 − InputCosty:1 · cy:3 · AF
= My:1 +
sy:2 ·By:1
rmaxAF
· ry:3 · AF − InputCosty:1 · cy:3 · AF , (E.9)
must be non-negative in sign. Finally, the Farmer’s money holdings My:1 at
the start of year y must be expressed as a function of event and decision
realizations occurring between t:3 and the end of year y − 1 and must also
be nonnegative in sign.
In principle, the Farmer’s expected UOC maximization problem outlined
above can be solved as a stochastic dynamic programming (DP) problem.
The key conceptual construct underlying stochastic DP for a decision-maker
dm is the value function Vt(I), defined to be the optimum expected total
reward that can be obtained by the dm, starting at time t in state I.
Suppose a dm is currently in state I at some current time t. Suppose
the dm implements a decision d, experiences a random event ω, obtains an
immediate reward Rt(I, d, ω), and transits to a new state I
′ = Xt(I, d, ω).
Then the best that the dm can do, starting from time t + 1, is Vt+1(I
′).
Consequently, letting E[·] denote expectation with respect to the random
event ω, the best the dm can do, starting in state I at time t, is
Vt(I) = max
d
E [Rt(I, d, ω) + βVt+1(Xt(I, d, ω))] (E.10)
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Finally, let Π∗ denote the optimal policy function giving the optimal decision
d∗ in (E.10) as a function d∗ = Π∗(t, I) of the current time t and state I.
Then (E.10) can equivalently be written as
Vt(I) = E [Rt(I,Π
∗(t, I)) + βVt+1(Xt(I,Π∗(t, I)), ω)] (E.11)
The recursive relationships (E.10) and (E.11) provide simple illustrations
of Richard Bellman’s celebrated principle of optimality for stochastic DP
problems; see (Powell, 2011, 2014).
On the other hand, it is impractical to expect the Farmer to be able
to solve a constrained expected intertemporal UOC maximization problem
of this form for each successive year t. It requires too much information
about the probability distributions for future input costs, corn prices, and
precipitation patterns, too much information about future city budgets and
subsidy portion selections {By:1, sy:2}y≥t, and too much computational time.
Consequently, in this study we instead investigate two alternative decision
modes that the Farmer could implement to obtain an approximate solution
for this problem. These two decision modes, F-OFF and F-ON, are described
in detail in Appendix E.2 and Appendix E.3, respectively.
Appendix E.2. F-OFF Decision Mode: Myopic Two-Stage Decision Process
As detailed in Section 4.3, at time t:3 during each year t the Farmer
allocates her farmland AF into three portions by choice of the percentages
(ct:3, rt:3). One portion, ct:3A
F , is for cropland, a second portion, rt:3A
F ,
is for retention land, and the remaining portion, [1 − ct:3 − rt:3]AF , is left
fallow. At the subsequent time t:7 the Farmer divides her money holdings
Mt:7(ct:3, τt:2rt:3) between consumption Cons
F
t:7 and savings S
F
t:7.
The F-OFF decision mode for the Farmer is summarized as follows. Dur-
ing each year t the Farmer determines her year-t land allocation and sub-
sequent consumption and savings portions by solving two successive myopic
decision problems, as follows:
 At time t:3, conditional on information state IFt:3, the Farmer chooses a
feasible land allocation (c, r) to maximize her expected possible money
holdings at time t:7, denoted by E[Mposst:7 (c, τt:2r) | IFt:3].
 At time t:7, conditional on information state IFt:7, the Farmer chooses
a consumption level ConsFt:7 to maximize her year-t UOC subject to a
savings-target constraint and a subsistence constraint.
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A detailed derivation of the if-then decision rules that solve these two suc-
cessive decision problems will now be given.
Using the notation from Section 4.3, the Farmer’s first-stage decision
problem at time t:3 takes the following form:
max
c,r
E
[
Mposst:7 (c, τt:2r) | IFt:3
]
(E.12)
subject to the feasibility conditions
0 ≤ c ≤ cmax(τt:2r) (E.13)
0 ≤ r ≤ rmax (E.14)
c+ r ≤ 1 (E.15)
where, as in (14),
cmax(τt:2r) = min{1, Mt:3(τt:2r)
InputCostt:1 · AF
} (E.16)
and, as derived in Appendix E.1,
Mposst:7 (c, τt:2r) = Mt:1 + τt:2rA
F
+
[
CPricet:6H(Precipt:5)− InputCostt:1
]
Acropt:3 (c) (E.17)
As detailed in Section 4.3, the Farmer’s information state IFt:3 at time t:3
includes: the information state IFt:1 (hence all structural parameters such as
AF ); the Farmer’s money holdingsMt:1 at time t:1; the realization InputCostt:1
for input costs at time t:1; the City Manager’s selection of a retention-land
subsidy rate τt:2 at time t:2; the stationary probability distributions gov-
erning corn price and harvest productivity; and the knowledge that these
probability distributions are independent of each other. It follows that
E
[
Mposst:7 (c, τt:2r) | It:3
]
= Mt:1 + τt:2rA
F
+
[
ECPrice · EH(Precip)− InputCostt:1
]
Acropt:3 (c) (E.18)
We will now develop an if-then decision rule for the Farmer that solves
this first-stage decision problem at time t:3. As noted above, and explained
carefully in Section 5.3, all stochastic events for the base-case application
are generated by independent stationary probability distributions that are
known to the Farmer.
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The net earnings obtained by the Farmer from the sale of her corn crop
at time t:7, per acre of planted cropland, is given by
NetEarnt:7 = CPricet:6 ·H(Precipt:5)− InputCostt:1 ($/acre) (E.19)
Given the ensemble of possible environmental scenarios specified in Appendix
D, the net earnings (E.19) can be either positive or negative. At time t:3
the Farmer calculates her expected net earnings per acre of planted cropland,
conditional on her observed per-acre input cost at time t:1, as
Et:3
[
picrop
]
= E
[
NetEarnt:7 | It:3
]
= ECPrice · EH(Precip)− InputCostt:1 (E.20)
In addition, the Farmer knows that her net earnings per acre of retention
land is given by the subsidy rate τt:2 announced by the City Manager at time
t:2, as determined in (3); i.e.,
pirett:3 = τt:2 (E.21)
Finally, the Farmer knows that her net earnings per acre of fallow land is
zero; i.e.,
pifalt:3 = 0 (E.22)
Also, as detailed in Appendix E.1, the Farmer’s base-case UOC function
(E.2) for each year t is specified to be a logarithmic (hence strictly concave)
function of her consumption at time t:7. It follows from Jensen’s inequality
for strictly concave functions8 that the Farmer is risk averse in the following
sense: If at time t:3 the Farmer is offered a choice between a sure-thing
option offering a consumption level C∗ for sure at time t:7 and a random
lottery that offers a non-degenerate random consumption level C at time t:7
whose expectation is C∗, the Farmer will strictly prefer the sure-thing option.
That is, u(C∗) = u(EC) > Eu(C). However, if the Farmer is offered two
different sure-thing options of equal value, we assume below that the Farmer
flips a fair coin to decide which option to accept.
Finally, consider the upper bound cmax(τt:2r) on ct:3, given by (E.16). If
τt:2 = 0, this upper bound is equal to c
max(0) independently of r. Suppose
8Jensen’s inequality, found in any standard real analysis textbook, can be roughly
stated as follows: If f(x) is a concave function of x, then f(Ex) ≥ Ef(x); and this
inequality holds strictly if f(x) is a strictly concave function of x.
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τt:2 > 0. In this case Mt:3(τt:2r) is a linear, positive-valued, and strictly-
increasing function of r ≥ 0, and cmax(τt:2r) is a continuous non-decreasing
function of r.
Claim: Given τt:2 > 0, there exists a largest value r
L ∈ [0, rmax] that maxi-
mizes cmax(τt:2r) subject to c
max(τt:2r) + r ≤ 1.
Proof: Suppose τt:2 > 0. If c
max(0) = 1, then rL = 0. If cmax(0) < 1, then,
since cmax(τt:2r) is a continuous non-decreasing function of r, there must be
a maximum range of r values of the form [0, r∗] with r∗ ≤ rmax for which
cmax(τt:2r) + r ≤ 1. If cmax(τt:2rmax) + rmax > 1, then r∗ is the solution to
cmax(τt:2r) + r = 1. If c
max(τt:2r
max) + rmax ≤ 1, then r∗ = rmax. By the
Weierstrass Theorem (or direct simple analysis), there must exist some point
in [0, r∗] at which the continuous function cmax(τt:2r) attains a maximum over
this interval. Since cmax(τt:2r) is non-decreasing in r, the largest value r
L in
[0, r∗] at which this maximum is attained is rL = r∗. QED
Given the above points, the solution (ct:3, rt:3) for the Farmer’s first-stage
decision problem (E.12) at time t:3 is as follows:
Solution to the Farmer’s First-Stage Decision Problem at Time t:3
Case 1: If Et:3pi
crop > Et:3pi
ret > Et:3pi
fal, plant the largest feasible portion
of farmland as cropland, allocate the portion rL to retention, and leave the
remaining portion fallow; i.e., set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (c
max(τt:2r
L), rL) (E.23)
Case 2: If Et:3pi
crop > Et:3pi
ret = Et:3pi
fal, plant the largest feasible portion
of farmland as cropland and, with prob 1/2-1/2, allocate the remaining
portion to retention or fallow land; i.e., with prob 1/2-1/2 set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (c
max(0),min{1− cmax(0), rmax})
or (ct:3, rt:3) = (c
max(0), 0) (E.24)
Case 3: If Et:3pi
ret > Et:3pi
fal ≥ Et:3picrop, allocate the largest feasible
portion of farmland to retention and leave the remainder fallow; i.e., set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (0, r
max) (E.25)
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Case 4: If Et:3pi
ret = Et:3pi
fal ≥ Et:3picrop, then with prob 1/2-1/2 allocate
the largest feasible portion of farmland to retention and the remainder to
fallow, or allocate all farmland to fallow; i.e., with prob 1/2-1/2 set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (0, r
max) or (ct:3, rt:3) = (0, 0) (E.26)
Case 5: If Et:3pi
ret ≥ Et:3picrop > Et:3pifal, allocate the largest feasible
portion of farmland to retention, allocate the largest feasible portion of the
remainder to cropland, and leave the rest fallow; i.e., set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (min{cmax(τt:2rmax), 1− rmax}, rmax) (E.27)
Consider, now, the Farmer’s second-stage decision problem at time t:7.
The Farmer’s savings target for her money holdings at the end of year t is
assumed to take the following form:
SF (θ0) = θ0 · E[CPrice] · C¯F (E.28)
In (E.28), θ0 is a risk-aversion factor whose value determines the scale of the
Farmer’s savings target, E[CPrice] is the stationary expectation for the an-
nual corn price, and C¯F is the Farmer’s annual subsistence need for corn. The
Farmer determines her corn consumption ConsFt:7 at time t:7 by implementing
the following if-then decision rule:
Solution to the Farmer’s Second-Stage Decision Problem at Time t:7
 If the Farmer’s money holdings are insufficient to attain her subsistence
consumption C¯F , that is, if Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) < CPricet:6 · C¯F , then
ConsFt:7 =
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)
CPricet:6
< C¯F (E.29)
and the Farmer dies at the end of subperiod t7.
 If the Farmer’s money holdings are sufficient to attain C¯F but not
to attain her targeted savings SF (θ0), that is, if CPricet:6 · C¯F ≤
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) < S
F (θ0) + CPricet:6 · C¯F , then
ConsFt:7 = C¯
F and SFt:7 = M
poss
t:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)− CPricet:6 · C¯F (E.30)
 If the Farmer’s money holdings are sufficient to attain C¯F and SF (θ0),
that is, if Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) ≥ SF (θ0) + CPricet:6 · C¯F , then
ConsFt:7 =
[
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)− SF (θ0)
]
CPricet:6
and SFt:7 = S
F (θ0) (E.31)
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Appendix E.3. F-ON Decision Mode: Yearly Expected UOC Maximization
As explained in Section 5.3 and Appendix D, all stochastic events for
the base-case application are generated by independent stationary probability
distributions that are known to the Farmer. In particular, then, the Farmer
knows the true stationary expectation for the annual corn price.
The F-ON decision mode for the Farmer is summarized as follows. At each
time t:3 during each successive year t, the Farmer selects her land allocation
percentages (ct:3, rt:3) and her consumption and savings levels Cons
F
t:7 and
SavFt:7 to maximize her expected UOC for year t subject to budget constraints
and an initially desired savings target for her end-of-year money holdings. As
in Appendix E.3, the Farmer’s initially desired savings target is assumed to
take the form (E.28).
The F-ON decision mode for the Farmer will now be more carefully ex-
plained. Without loss of generality, attention will be focused on the Farmer’s
implementation of this decision mode at time 1:3 for year 1. The resulting
problem formulation is easily generalized to apply to arbitrary successive
years t ≥ 1.
Suppose the Farmer at time 1:3 in year 1 is considering the selection of
her land allocation, consumption, and savings decisions for year 1, denoted
as follows:
dF =
(
c1:3, r1:3,Cons
F
1:7, S
F
1:7
)
(E.32)
However, the Farmer realizes that, between her choice of land allocation
percentages at time 1:3 and her choice of consumption and savings decisions
at time 1:7, she will acquire additional information: namely, she will observe
the realization of a precipitation pattern Precip1:5 at time 1:5 and a corn
price CPrice1:6 at time 1:6. Consequently, in order to make efficient use of
her information, she should choose the decisions in (E.32) as functions of her
available information.
The Farmer’s information state IF1:3 at time 1:3 includes her information
state IF1:1 at time 1:1, her input-cost observation InputCost1:1 at time 1:1,
and the City Manager’s subsidy percentage s1:2 for year 1 as announced at
time 1:2. That is,
IF1:3 =
{
IF1:1, InputCost1:1, s1:2
}
(E.33)
The Farmer’s information state IF1:1 at time 1:1 in turn includes all main-
tained structural aspects of the Farmer’s decision environment, including the
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initially given level θ0 for the scale factor θ determining her savings target
(E.28) for the end of year 1.
At time 1:3 the Farmer selects her choices for c1:3 and r1:3 from her decision
domain DDF (rmax) in (29) as functions c(IF1:3) and r(I
F
1:3) of the information
set IF1:3. However, the Farmer also understands that her information set I
F
1:7
at time 1:7 will be larger than her information set IF1:3 at time 1:3, as follows:
IF1:7 =
{
IF1:3,Precip1:5,CPrice1:6
}
(E.34)
Consequently, to determine an optimal solution for her expected UOC maxi-
mization problem at time 1:3, the Farmer chooses a collection of information-
contingent decision functions of the following form:
dF (I) =
(
c(IF1:3), r(I
F
1:3),Cons
F (I1:7), S
F (I1:7)
)
(E.35)
The F-ON Farmer’s expected UOC maximization problem at time 1:3
thus takes the following form:
max E [u(ConsF1:7) | IF1:3] (E.36)
with respect to choice of dF subject to the constraints
dF = dF (I) (E.37)
0 ≤ c1:3 (E.38)
0 ≤ r1:3 ≤ rmax (E.39)
c1:3 + r1:3 ≤ 1 (E.40)
M1:3 = M1:1 + τ1:2 · r1:3 · AF (E.41)
M1:4 = M1:3 − InputCost1:1 · c1:3 · AF (E.42)
M1:4 ≥ 0 (E.43)
Mposs1:7 = M1:4 + CPrice1:6 ·H1:5 · c1:3 · AF (E.44)
ConsF1:7 ≥ C¯F (E.45)
CPrice1:6 · ConsF1:7 = Mposs1:7 − SF1:7 (E.46)
SF1:7 = θ1:7 · E
[
CPrice
] · C¯F (E.47)
θ1:7 = max
0≤ρ≤1
{ ρ · θ0 | F’s maximization problem has a solution} (E.48)
Detailed explanations for constraints (E.38) through (E.47) are provided
in Section 4.3. However, constraint (E.48) needs further explanation. Sup-
pose the savings-target scaling factor θ is simply fixed at the initial value
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θ0, and the constraint (E.48) is omitted. Then the above expected UOC
maximization problem will fail to have a solution if there exists an informa-
tion state I1:7 for which the Farmer is unable to achieve both her savings
target and her subsistence consumption needs. Consequently, it is instead
assumed that the F-ON Farmer is able to ratchet down the value of θ0 to-
wards zero in any feasible information state I1:7 in which she is unable to
secure her subsistence consumption needs at the initial scaling level θ0. This
information-contingent downward ratcheting is captured in constraint (E.48).
A solution will still fail to exist if there exists at least one feasible informa-
tion state I1:7 for which the F-ON Farmer is unable to secure her subsistence
consumption needs even if she ratchets her year-1 savings target all the way
down to zero.
For analytical tractability, the F-ON Farmer’s decision domain DDF (rmax)
in (29) – represented by constraints (E.38) through (E.40) in the above ex-
pected UOC maximization problem – is approximated by a finite subset ADF ,
constructed as follows. First, the upper limit rmax for the portion r of farm-
land that the F-ON Farmer can allocate to retention land, interpreted as a
watershed policy parameter, is maintained at the fixed value 0.25. Second,
the range of possible values for the F-ON Farmer’s cropland portion c and
retention land portion r are restricted to the following subsets:
c ∈ C = {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0} (E.49)
r ∈ R(rmax) = {0.0, 0.2, . . . , 0.8, 1.0} · rmax (E.50)
Then ADF is given by
ADF = {(c, r) | c ∈ C, r ∈ R(rmax), c+ r ≤ 1} (E.51)
Finally, if the expected UOC maximization problem (E.36) for any year t
has multiple possible solutions, the F-ON Farmer uses a random “coin flip”
to select a particular solution.
Appendix F. CM-ON Base-Case Budget-Allocation Process
As explained in Section 4.3, at time t:2 in each year t the City Manager
allocates the year-t city budget Bt:1 into three portions by choice of the
percentages (st:2, `t:2). One portion is for city social service expenditures,
a second portion is for retention-land subsidies (a flood-damage mitigation
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measure), and a third portion is for levee investment (another flood-damage
mitigation measure).
Under CM-ON treatments, described in Section 5.4, the City Manager is
a welfare optimizer with successive one-year planning horizons. The objec-
tive of the City Manager at time t:2 in each year t is to select (st:2, `t:2) to
maximize expected city social welfare (CSW) for year t, subject to system
constraints.9
Actual CSW for year t cannot be determined until time t:5, after city
social-service expenditures and flood damage for year t have both been real-
ized. This actual CSW is measured by
CSWt:5 = SocServ
act
t:3 + ψ ·
[
FDmax − FDt:5
]
, (F.1)
where the trade-off weight ψ is strictly positive. The term FDmax in (F.1)
denotes the maximum avoidable city flood damage in any given year, hence
[FDmax−FDt:5] measures the amount of city flood damage avoided in year t.
Actual CSW in year t is thus a weighted combination of year-t city social
service expenditures and year-t city flood-damage mitigation.
At time t:2 the CM-ON City Manager does not know what the actual
social-service expenditures and flood-damage mitigation will be at time t:5.
However, given his objective, he will allocate the entire city budget to social
services unless he sees some way in which the flood damage FDt:5 can be
mitigated by his choices of st:2 and lt:2 at time t:2.
In actual fact, FDt:5 does depend on the City Manager’s choices for st:2
and lt:2. This follows because flood damage is determined by the functional
relationship (19), reproduced here for ease of reference:
FDt:5 = FD(LQt:2, Qp,t:5) (F.2)
where the peak water discharge rate Qp is given by
Qp,t:5 = Qp(Precipt:5, A
crop
t:3 , A
ret
t:3 , A
fal
t:3 ) (F.3)
Thus, FDt:5 depends through Qp,t:5 on the Farmer’s land allocation decisions,
which in turn depend on the City Manager’s retention subsidy decision st:2;
9Levee investment at time t:2 is a physical capital investment that could yield a stream
of returns over both current and future years in the form of increased flood-damage mitiga-
tion. Ideally, this full stream of returns should be taken into account in the specification of
CSW. However, for the base-case application, it is assumed for simplicity that the CM-ON
City Manager at each time t:2 only considers year-t returns to levee investment.
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and FDt:5 depends directly on the levee quality LQt:2, which in turn depends
on the City Manager’s levee investment decision `t:2.
The CM-ON City Manager’s information state ICMt:2 at time t:2 includes
the input cost realized at time t:1, denoted by InputCostt:1. In addition, how-
ever, it also includes all structural aspects of the CM’s decision environment,
including in particular the independent stationary probability distributions
governing the realization of the precipitation pattern Precipt:5 during subpe-
riods t:1 through t:4 and the realization of the corn price CPricet:6 at time
t:6. Thus, the CM-ON City Manager at time t:2 is able to calculate the
Farmer’s response functions r(IFt:3) and c(I
F
t:3) for ct:3 and rt:3 at time t:3 as
functions of the Farmer’s time-t:3 information set10
IFt:3 = {IFt:1, InputCostt:1, st:2} (F.4)
However, the CM-ON City Manager at time t:2 still does not know for sure
the future flood damage level FDt:5 as a function of his decisions st:2 and `t:2
at time t:2 because FDt:5 also depends (through Qp,t:5) on the random event
Precipt:5. Thus, from the vantage point of t:2, year-t CSW is an (st:2, `t:2)-
conditioned random variable of the form
CSW (st:2, `t:2, c(It:3), r(It:3),Precipt:5) (F.5)
where the only aspect that is random as of time t:2 is the precise realization
for Precipt:5. Consequently, at time t:2 the CM-ON City Manager forms an
expectation for year-t CSW, conditional on each of his possible choices for
(st:2, `t:2), where the expectation is taken with respect to the known proba-
bility distribution for Precipt:5.
The CM-ON City Manager’s expected CSW maximization problem at
time t:2 thus takes the following form:
max
st:2,`t:2
E[CSW (st:2, `t:2, c(I
F
t:3), r(I
F
t:3),Precipt:5) | ICMt:2 ] (F.6)
subject to the constraints
0 ≤ st:2 (F.7)
0 ≤ `t:2 (F.8)
st:2 + `t:2 ≤ 1 (F.9)
10In game theory terms, this makes the CM-ON City Manager a Stackelberg leader,
able to determine the response of the Farmer-follower at time t:3 to each of his possible
decisions st:2 at time t:2.
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For analytical tractability, the City Manager’s decision domain DDCM in
(30) – represented by constraints (F.7) through (F.9) above – is approximated
by a finite subset ADCM , constructed as follows. The range of possible values
for the City Manager’s subsidy portion s and levee investment portion ` are
restricted to the following subsets:
s ∈ S = {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0} (F.10)
` ∈ L = {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0} (F.11)
Then ADCM is given by
ADCM = {(s, `) | s ∈ S, ` ∈ L, s+ ` ≤ 1} (F.12)
Finally, if the expected CSW maximization problem (F.6) for any year
t has multiple possible solutions, the CM-ON City Manager uses a random
“coin flip” to select a particular solution.
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